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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the last decade, alternative litigation finance (“ALF”) has increasingly garnered 
attention from news reporters, policymakers, and scholars. ALF is the funding of 
litigation through third-party companies—entities other than plaintiffs, defendants, and 
the litigants’ attorneys or insurers. The ALF industry has grown rapidly in the past two 
decades and has three primary segments: the financing of tort plaintiffs (“consumer 
litigation funding”), the financing of law firms (“law firm funding”), and the financing of 
business plaintiffs involved in commercial lawsuits (“commercial litigation funding”). 
This dissertation examines consumer litigation funding (“CLF”). CLF is structured as a 
nonrecourse loan: a plaintiff obtains a cash advance in exchange for repaying that 
advance and any interest or fees out of the lawsuit proceeds that remain after the attorney 
and other higher-priority creditors are paid (“remaining case proceeds”). The maximum 
amount that a CLF financier can collect from the plaintiff is the remaining case proceeds; 
that is, the plaintiff pays either the total owed to the financier or the remaining case 
proceeds—whichever amount is lower. The plaintiff pays the financier nothing if he loses 
his lawsuit. 
 This dissertation is the first work to empirically analyze issues involving CLF. In 
Chapter I, I investigate the effect of access to CLF on medical malpractice litigation. 
Advocates of tort reform, which allege that the current tort system incentivizes too much 
litigation (particularly, frivolous litigation) and arbitrarily awards high damages, have 
rallied against CLF. Theoretically, CLF can decrease a plaintiff’s risk premium and 
discount rate so that the plaintiff is able to hold out for a higher settlement. CLF can also 
increase the plaintiff’s expected benefits of filing so that they outweigh the expected 
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costs, enabling the plaintiff to bring the lawsuit. Chapter I examines whether there is 
empirical support for such theoretical effects. Specifically, I explore the impact of the 
availability of these nonrecourse loans on medical malpractice litigation outcomes by 
using 2004–2012 closed claim data from the National Practitioner Data Bank. Exploiting 
time and geographic variation of state actions related to CLF (“difference-in-
differences”), I find evidence consistent with the aforementioned theoretical effects. 
Access to CLF increases claim payment, claim duration, and the filing rate. 
 In Chapter II, I investigate the effect of access to CLF on bankruptcy. Because 
funded individuals are likely unsophisticated, have low incomes, and have been 
physically injured in the incidents implicating the legal claims, consumer advocacy 
organizations argue for harsh restrictions on this financial service. Chapter II presents the 
first empirical study of CLF’s impact on consumer welfare, measured by Chapter 7 
and 13 bankruptcy filings. I obtain bankruptcy data from the Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (1998–2012) and U.S. Courts Statistics and Reports (2013–15). 
Employing difference-in-differences with state actions related to CLF, I find that access 
to CLF reduces the Chapter 7, Chapter 13, and joint Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates. This 
suggests that CLF may improve consumer welfare by helping liquidity-constrained 
plaintiffs avoid bankruptcy as they wait for the resolution of their cases. 
 In Chapter III, I examine whether the strength of the relationship between the 
financier and the funded individual’s law firm is positively or negatively associated with 
the financier’s gross return and interest rate. Critics of the legal finance industry have 
claimed that a strong financier-law firm relationship creates situations in which the law 
firm is tempted to make decisions that benefit the financier at the expense of the law 
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firm’s current clients. Chapter III explores whether empirical support of this claim exists. 
It is the first study to use financier administrative data. I find that the strength of the 
financier-law firm relationship, measured by relationship duration, is negatively 
associated with the gross return on funding and interest rate. The results do not provide 
support for critics’ allegation but is instead consistent with the following theory: over 
time, the financier learns more about a law firm’s skills and trustworthiness. After 
positive repeat interactions with the law firm, the financier becomes increasingly willing 
to fund high-risk cases affiliated with that law firm, thus reducing the financier’s gross 
return. The financier also becomes more reliant on that law firm’s recommendations to 
fund cases, thus decreasing the financier’s case screening expenses and, in turn, the 
interest rate. 
 In sum, this dissertation provides the first empirical examination of issues related 
to CLF. It shows that access to CLF increases medical malpractice claim payment, claim 
duration, and the filing rate, as well as decreases the Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy filing 
rates. It also provides some evidence that closer relationships between financiers and 
plaintiffs’ law firms do not harm plaintiffs. While the data used in these studies do not 
allow for an evaluation of social welfare, the results suggest that CLF may be a beneficial 
source of credit for cash-constrained plaintiffs and that good working relationships 
between financiers and plaintiffs’ law firms may benefit plaintiffs.  
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CHAPTER I. THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING ON 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 
 
1. Introduction 
 The modern tort reform movement began in the 1970s when a coalition of 
businesses, professional groups, and nonprofits sought to curb what the coalition viewed 
as frivolous litigation (Rhode 2004, p. 473). Since then, several waves of tort reform have 
taken place in the mid-1980s, late 1990s, and early 2000s. Each wave resulted in modest 
success for the reformers as state legislatures enacted damages caps, modified joint and 
several liability, and altered the collateral source rule.1 Those behind this effort, including 
the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (“NAMIC”), the American 
Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”), and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform (“ILR”), assert that the existing tort liability system fosters too much litigation, 
that many of the cases are frivolous, and that juries award arbitrary damages (see, e.g., 
NAMIC 2005; ATRA 2016; Doroshow 2011). 
 Now the actors behind the tort reform campaign have a new opponent: the 
litigation funding industry. This industry has grown rapidly in the last twenty years and 
has three primary segments: “(1) companies that provide consumers with legal funding 
                                                
1 Economic damages compensate plaintiffs for tangible harms such as lost wages. Non-economic damages 
compensate plaintiffs for intangible harms such as pain and suffering; non-economic damages caps limit 
these damages. Punitive damages are awarded to deter defendants from engaging in tortious acts; punitive 
damages caps limit these damages. Total damages caps limit the sum of economic, non-economic, and 
punitive damages. Joint and several liability allows plaintiffs to recover the entire award from any 
defendant, regardless of that defendant’s percentage of liability. Many states now permit plaintiffs to 
recover from each defendant only the portion of the award for which the defendant is responsible. Other 
states allow plaintiffs to collect the total award from a defendant only if that defendant was liable for more 
than a certain percentage of the harm. The collateral source rule prevents defendants from introducing 
evidence that plaintiffs were compensated for harm from other sources such as plaintiffs’ own insurance. 
Many states now require or permit compensation from other sources to be factored into the calculation of 
damages. 
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[consumer litigation funders], (2) companies that lend to plaintiffs’ law firms [law firm 
lenders], and (3) companies that invest in commercial (i.e., business-against-business) 
claims on the plaintiff side [commercial litigation funders]” (Garber 2010, p. 8). Unlike 
the traditional financiers of lawsuits—litigants, law firms, and insurers—legal finance 
businesses are third parties with no direct interest in the underlying cases (Garber 2010, 
p. 1). NAMIC, ATRA, and ILR have taken firm stances against funding (NAMIC 2011; 
ATRA 2010; Beisner et al. 2009). Their argument against legal finance resembles that 
against the tort liability system: funding incentivizes more litigation and specifically 
more frivolous lawsuits (NAMIC 2011, p. 6–7; Joyce 2011, p. 2–4; Beisner and 
Rubin 2012, p. 4). These organizations allege that financiers take on individually risky 
cases if financiers’ overall litigation portfolios are strong and that financiers encourage 
plaintiffs to file lawsuits with little merit. Proponents of funding maintain that financiers 
are rational in their investments, that they have incentives to create reputations for aiding 
meritorious cases, and that plaintiffs have already gained the support of attorneys prior to 
applying for funding (Rodak 2006, p. 519; Lyon 2010, p. 593).  
 The industry segment most relevant to tort litigation is consumer legal funding. A 
tort plaintiff, such as one in a medical malpractice lawsuit, can apply for a cash advance 
from a funder. If the financier gives the plaintiff an advance, the plaintiff must return the 
advance plus interest and fees out of the case proceeds that remain after payment of 
attorney’s fees and other higher-priority debts (Garber 2010, p. 10–12; Beydler 2012, 
p. 1163). If this remaining portion of the settlement or trial award is lower than the total 
sum owed to the funder, then the plaintiff is not required to pay the difference between 
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the amount owed and the remaining portion. In essence, funding operates as a 
nonrecourse loan, where the collateral is the lawsuit.2 
 As of 2016, seventeen states have already taken steps to address these 
nonrecourse loans. As more states confront this growing industry, the need for empirical 
evidence on the effects of this alternative credit source becomes more urgent. This paper 
is the first to empirically examine consumer litigation funding. Specifically, it explores 
the effect of access to funding on medical malpractice claims. 3  Limiting medical 
malpractice liability has been a chief focus of tort reformers since medical malpractice 
insurance premiums have spiked several times over the last few decades 
(Black et al. 2005, p. 208; Avraham 2007, p. S184). Tort reformers are concerned that 
increasing liability will lead to rising insurance premiums, higher levels of defensive 
medicine, and more reductions in physician supply.  
In this study, I employ a difference-in-differences identification strategy and use 
the variation in timing and geography from funding-related state actions to investigate the 
impact of the availability of nonrecourse loans on medical malpractice litigation 
outcomes. I draw on 2004–2012 medical malpractice closed claim data from the National 
Practitioner Data Bank. I run ordinary least squares regressions to examine claim 
payment, which is the amount paid in the resolution of the claim, and the filing rate, 
which is defined as the number of closed claims at the state-year level per 100,000 
residents or per 1,000 physicians. I also run Cox Proportional Hazards Model regressions 
                                                
2 Depending on the state, the cash advance may or may not be considered a “loan” for legal purposes. For 
example, courts in Michigan and Colorado, as well as financial regulators in Maryland, Kansas, and South 
Carolina, have ruled that funding is a loan under state consumer credit law. In contrast, a Texas court has 
held that funding is not a loan but instead an investment. 
3 Many financiers provide cash advances to medical malpractice plaintiffs. A Google search for “litigation 
finance medical malpractice” brought up sixteen of these companies on the first two pages alone. 
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to examine the claim duration hazard rate; claim duration is the time from the year of 
incident to the year of resolution. The hazard rate is the probability that the claim will be 
resolved at t years, conditional on the claim not being resolved yet. 
This paper provides some evidence that access to funding increases medical 
malpractice claim payment, claim duration, and the filing rate. An Ohio Supreme Court 
decision expressly banned litigation finance from 2003 to 2008. I find that this 
prohibition decreased claim payment by 18 percentage points and caused cases to resolve 
3.4 times faster, reducing claim duration. The prohibition also lowered filings by 1.2 per 
100,000 residents and by 3.6 per 1,000 physicians. Next, state appellate courts in 
Florida (1996) and Texas (2006) refused to condemn funding under usury laws or 
doctrines against champerty and maintenance—an action that I call “acknowledgment.” 
Judicial acknowledgments of funding are analogous to legislature legalizations of a credit 
product. I find that these acknowledgments caused cases to resolve 15 percent slower, 
lengthening claim duration. The acknowledgments also increased filings by 0.34 per 
100,000 residents and 1.6 per 1,000 physicians.  
When regulating funding, policymakers should consider the costs and benefits of 
the business practice. This study sheds light on these considerations. The claim payment 
and claim duration results are consistent with the theory that funding strengthens a 
plaintiff’s bargaining position by lowering his risk premium and discount rate. Further, 
the empirical analysis provides support that nonrecourse advances increase the filing rate. 
Even if plaintiffs enter legal finance agreements after contracting with attorneys 
(Rodak 2006, p. 519), the availability of these advances appears to affect plaintiffs’ filing 
decisions. While a rise in the filing rate may translate into an increase in liability costs for 
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the medical industry, this rise may also signal an increase in access to justice for plaintiffs 
who were previously barred from the legal system due to high risk aversion or scarce 
financial resources.  
Section 2 presents background information on nonrecourse advances. Section 3 
gives an overview of the relevant literature. Section 4 describes the state actions that 
affect the aggregate number of these advances. Section 5 provides the theoretical 
predictions while Section 6 presents the data and empirical specifications. Sections 7 
and 8 report the results of the main regressions and robustness checks. Section 9 
discusses the results, and Section 10 concludes. 
2. Background Information 
In order to obtain a nonrecourse loan, the plaintiff must disclose basic lawsuit 
information to the financier so that the financier can calculate the expected profitability 
of the case (Estevao 2013, p. 474). Specifically, the funder determines its expected return 
from the lawsuit by examining the extent and type of harm, the predicted damages, the 
likelihood of a settlement or trial award, and any debts that must be paid prior to the 
repayment of the advance (Estevao 2013, p. 474). Providing case information to the 
financier may result in the waiver of attorney-client privilege or protection derived from 
the work-product doctrine. Currently, there is no general rule regarding waiver across all 
U.S. jurisdictions (Nieuwveld and Shannon 2012, p. 141–42; Giesel 2012; Giesel 2014).  
 If the funder approves the plaintiff’s application, then it advances 10 to 20 percent 
of the expected value of the lawsuit (Appelbaum 2011a; Garber 2010, p. 12). 
Commentators have reported that cash advances vary from $500 to $100,000 
(Carter 2004; Garber 2010, p. 12) and that interest rates range from 2 to 15 percent per 
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month (Carter 2004; Griffis 2011; Appelbaum 2011a). Plaintiffs generally use their cash 
advances to cover their utilities, car payments, rent, mortgage, food, and medical 
expenses (Rodak 2006, p. 514; Estevao 2013, p. 476; Garber 2010, p. 12; Skiba and Xiao, 
forthcoming). They do not spend the funding on attorney’s fees and litigation expenses 
because in personal injury cases, plaintiffs typically make contingency fee arrangements 
with their lawyers (Garber 2010, p. 9). Under a contingency fee contract, the lawyer 
fronts the litigation costs in exchange for a portion (normally one-third) of the client’s 
settlement or trial award (Kritzer 2004, p. 39). The attorney’s percentage is higher in 
priority than the repayment to the financier; thus, the attorney gets paid prior to the 
funder.  
 Consumer legal funding differs from law firm lending and commercial litigation 
funding. Law firm lending involves the provision of credit to plaintiffs’ law firms 
(Garber 2010, p. 13). The firm can use its assets (e.g., real property, future lawsuit 
revenues) to secure its debt to the financier (Garber 2010, p. 13). Interest rates begin at 
25 percent per year and can vary depending on the firm’s future prospects 
(Molot 2010, p. 98). The loan is usually not capped at the remaining case proceeds, 
though some financiers offer nonrecourse loans to firms to fund certain lawsuits 
(Garber 2010, p. 13; Engstrom 2013, p. 117). Next, commercial litigation funding 
involves supplying capital to plaintiffs in commercial cases in exchange for a portion of 
the lawsuit proceeds (Garber 2010, p. 13; Molot 2010, p. 96). This funding is 
nonrecourse since the financier recovers nothing if a plaintiff loses. Patent and antitrust 
cases are those most commonly funded (Garber 2010, p. 13; Shepherd 2012, p. 601). 
Financiers give hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars to business plaintiffs in these 
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suits (Garber 2010, p. 16). Unlike consumer advances that are used for living expenses, 
commercial advances are often used to front attorney’s fees and litigation costs 
(Molot 2014, p. 179; Shepherd and Stone 2015, p. 946). Molot (2014, p. 179, 183) has 
claimed that commercial legal funding often helps secure a higher quality law firm.  
3. Related Literature 
No previous study has empirically analyzed legal finance in the United States, and 
no paper has empirically examined consumer litigation funding anywhere in the world. 
While a number of law review articles have detailed the issues related to litigation 
finance and offer policy recommendations (e.g., Rodak 2006; Molot 2010; Steinitz 2011; 
Beydler 2012; Estevao 2013; Molot 2014; Shepherd and Stone 2015; Xiao 2015), few 
papers involve formal theoretical or empirical analysis. This Section highlights three 
studies with such analysis that are most relevant to the inquiry at hand.  
First, Daughety and Reinganum (2014) modeled the relationship between 
consumer litigation funding and settlement. They presented a two-period (five-stage) 
signaling model in which a plaintiff and his attorney have private information about his 
true lawsuit value. Daughety and Reinganum found that an “optimal loan” (i.e., a loan 
that maximizes the joint expected payoff to the plaintiff and funder) leads to full 
settlement. The optimal loan is a nonrecourse loan that is structured so that the plaintiff’s 
expected net proceeds from trial do not vary based on the true case value. A non-optimal 
loan may lead to bargaining breakdown; that is, a nonrecourse loan that is too small to 
make the plaintiff indifferent between trial and settlement may incentivize the plaintiff to 
go to trial.4  
                                                
4 Avraham and Wickelgren (2014) constructed a model in which a consumer legal funding agreement could 
be used as evidence to signal that the case is strong and demonstrated that such signaling can lead to lower 
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Second, the only empirical litigation funding studies that exist are Abrams and 
Chen (2013) and Chen (2015), both of which examined the financing of commercial 
lawsuits in Australia. Abrams and Chen (2013) obtained data from Australian courts, 
administrative agencies, and IMF Ltd., which is the largest funder in Australia. First, the 
authors used IMF Ltd. expenditures for each Australian jurisdiction as a proxy for the 
presence of legal finance in that jurisdiction and found that higher expenditures were 
associated with greater court backlogs, fewer case finalizations, and lower lawsuit 
clearance rates. Second, the authors employed a case study methodology to examine 
seven funded and sixteen unfunded cases with published opinions. Abrams and Chen 
discovered that funded case opinions cited, and were cited, almost twice as much as those 
of unfunded cases; this suggests that litigation finance promotes the faster development 
of legal precedent.  
Chen (2015) used similar data as that used in Abrams and Chen (2013). First, 
Chen presented a model that predicts the third-party financing of cases where there exists 
no strong legal precedent. Second, the author provided empirical analysis that confirmed 
the results of Abrams and Chen (2013) and produced additional findings. Chen found that 
IMF Ltd.’s profits were negatively associated with case citations, and in Australian 
jurisdictions where litigation funding is de jure legal, IMF Ltd. expenditures were 
positively associated with the number of case filings and finalizations.  
The conclusions from Abrams and Chen (2013) and Chen (2015) likely cannot be 
extrapolated to consumer lawsuit finance in the United States for two primary reasons. 
First, these studies focused on commercial litigation funding. Such funding is quite 
                                                                                                                                            
interest rates. Deffains and Desrieux (2015) modeled the effect of commercial litigation funding on lawsuit 
outcomes and found that such funding may decrease settlements in some scenarios and may increase claims 
in which the plaintiff did not suffer the alleged injury.  
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different from consumer funding. Consumer financiers advance cash to individuals who 
are plaintiffs in tort lawsuits; commercial financiers supply capital to businesses that are 
plaintiffs in commercial cases. Though both advances are nonrecourse, the cash given in 
the former is much less than that in the latter (thousands versus millions of dollars). 
Second, these papers examined funding in Australia, where contingency fee arrangements 
are not permitted (Chen 2015, p. 28; Papadakis 2016).5 The effect of funding in the 
United States may differ from that in Australia because contingency fees already existed 
in the United States when funding arose. Further, financiers in Australia see their role as 
one akin to insurers; that is, financiers may help plaintiffs by choosing attorneys and 
deciding how to handle the legal claims (Martin 2008, p. 109; Cameron 2012, p 64). In 
contrast, financiers in the United States generally do not direct or manage the litigation,6 
in part due to stringent rules of attorney conduct that do not allow third parties to interfere 
with the independent judgment of lawyers (see Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2, 
2.1, and 1.8(f)).  
 Finally, despite the existence of a substantial literature on medical malpractice 
litigation, no study has yet explored the effect of nonrecourse loans on this type of 
personal injury action. Empirical papers on medical malpractice claims cover topics such 
as tort reforms (Danzon 1984; Danzon 1986; Sloan et al. 1989; Born and Viscusi 1998; 
Yoon 2001; Viscusi and Born 2005; Avraham 2007; Born et al. 2009), apology laws (Ho 
                                                
5 Although contingency fees do not exist in Australia, some lawyers take clients on a “no win-no fee” basis 
(Cameron 2012, p. 61–62). That is, lawyers receive payment only if they win the case. The payment can be 
an ex ante fixed fee or a fee calculated based on an hourly rate. These no win-no fee agreements can also 
include additional “success fee[s]” if the lawyers win.  
6 Each member of the American Legal Finance Association agrees not to “[a]cquire ownership in [the] 
client’s litigation” and not to “[i]nterfere or participate in [the] client’s litigation” (ALFA 2016). See also 
Charge Injection Techs, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., C.A. No. N07C-12-134-JRJ (Del. Super. 
Ct. March 9, 2016) (finding that the financier was neither “controlling or forcing” the plaintiff to pursue 
litigation nor “controlling the litigation for the purpose of continuing a frivolous or unwanted lawsuit”). 
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and Liu 2011a, 2011b), fee shifting (Snyder and Hughes 1990; Hughes and Snyder 1995), 
characteristics of payments (Sloan and Hsieh 1990; Hyman et al. 2007; 
Hyman et al. 2011), and early offer reform (Hersch et al. 2007; Black et al. 2009). This 
work expands the literature by considering the effect of third-party funding on medical 
malpractice litigation outcomes. 
4. State Actions 
This paper employs a difference-in-differences estimation strategy to examine the 
effect of consumer legal funding on lawsuit outcomes. In conducting the analysis, I use 
state actions that affect access to, and demand for, funding as proxies for changes to the 
aggregate number of nonrecourse loans. I find all state actions that impact the time period 
2004–2012 and organize them into four groups based on whether an action restricts or 
promotes funding and how large the action’s effect should be on the total number of 
nonrecourse advances. 7  From most to least restrictive, these categories are 
(1) prohibition, (2) interest rate or fee cap, (3) disclosure law, and (4) acknowledgment. 
Table 1 reports these state actions, along with their citations, by category. When a state 
action has features that relate to more than one category, I put the action in the category 
that reflects its most restrictive feature since this feature primarily dictates how financiers 
respond to the law. Because I am the first to study the effects of these governing actions, 
the categories are not based on previous studies. The rest of this Section provides a 
description of each category.  
                                                
7 In addition to my own research using Westlaw and LexisNexis, I obtain information from the following 
secondary sources: Nieuwveld and Shannon (2012, p. 144–59) provide a state survey of laws related to 
litigation funding; Bond (2002, p. 1333–41) provides a state survey of maintenance and champerty laws; 
Xiao (2015, p. 270–75) describes laws and regulations relevant to consumer litigation funding; the U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform updates its website with news about third-party litigation funding 
(ILR 2016); and the National Conference of State Legislatures documents litigation finance bills considered 
by state legislatures in recent years (NCSL 2016).  
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     4.1 Prohibition 
 Prohibitions eliminate litigation finance completely. There is only one express 
ban that affects the time period 2004–2012. In 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 
consumer legal funding contract is void based on common law prohibitions against 
champerty and maintenance. In this case, the plaintiff had received a $6,000 advance 
from Future Settlement Funding Corporation and a $1,000 advance from Interim 
Settlement Funding Corporation. The plaintiff had agreed that she would repay the 
advances with interest out of the proceeds of her lawsuit against State Farm in which she 
sought uninsured motorist benefits after a serious collision. The court stated that these 
cash advances would “prolong litigation and reduce settlement incentives” and thus 
invoked the doctrines against champerty and maintenance in order to ban funding. 
Though the legal definitions differ from state to state, maintenance is generally when a 
third party with no bona fide interest in the case assists a litigant in bringing the lawsuit, 
and champerty is a type of maintenance in which the third party seeks to profit from 
litigation proceeds. The Rancman prohibition was in effect until August 2008, when the 
Ohio legislature adopted a statute that permitted third parties to make nonrecourse loans 
to plaintiffs.8  
 Consumer litigation funding does not automatically fall under the prohibitions 
against champerty and maintenance. Some courts have previously concluded that the 
bans do not apply to nonrecourse advances. For example, in 2008, a North Carolina 
appellate court held that legal finance is not champertous.9 The plaintiff had obtained a 
$3,000 advance from Legal Bucks, LLC, and promised to repay the advance with interest 
                                                
8 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55. 
9 Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
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out of the proceeds of her motor vehicle accident case. Although the facts resembled 
those in Rancman, the court noted that North Carolina’s laws, unlike Ohio’s laws, 
required financiers to have the intent of instigating litigation—an element that was 
missing in the case at hand. Indeed, funders recognize that the elements and application 
of the laws against champerty and maintenance vary from state to state. Thus, they still 
operate in states that have these prohibitions but have not yet applied them to funding, 
such as Alabama and Georgia.10 
 The bans against champerty and maintenance directly affect financiers only when 
courts apply them to void funding contracts as in Rancman. Thus, I treat the Ohio 
prohibition as a litigation funding state action and create a separate variable to account 
for any indirect effects that the champerty and maintenance laws may have on lawsuit 
outcomes through a non-funding mechanism (see Section 6.1.2).  
     4.2 Interest Rate or Fee Cap 
An interest rate or fee cap limits the price of consumer litigation funding and 
makes it unprofitable for financiers with capital costs above the maximum price to 
continue operating. Many commentators note that annual percentage rates (“APRs”) for 
funding often amount to over 100 percent per year (Carter 2004; Griffis 2011; 
Appelbaum 2011a, 2011b). Thus, the caps described in the following paragraph should 
be binding for high-cost financiers or cause low-cost financiers to scale back on high-risk 
advances, reducing the total number of nonrecourse advances (see, e.g., ALFA 2014).11  
                                                
10 For example, Oasis Financial, a consumer litigation funder, does not list Alabama or Georgia as states in 
which the firm does not provide cash advances to plaintiffs, even though these states have laws against 
champerty and maintenance (Oasis Financial 2016). 
11 I attempt to run regressions in which I break out the four categories into smaller categories and treat 
certain caps as categories by themselves. However, increased multicollinearity makes the results unreliable, 
as narrower categories cause many state fixed effects to fall out.  
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Four interest rate or fee caps affect the time period 2004–2012. In 2004, a 
Michigan appellate court concluded that a lawsuit advance is subject to the state usury 
law’s interest rate cap of 7 percent per year. In 2008, a North Carolina appellate court 
held that funding is an “advance” that falls under the state usury law, which restricts 
interest during the term of the loan to the greater of 16 percent or a rate determined by the 
Commissioner of Banks. In 2009, the Maryland Commissioner of Financial Regulation 
ruled that funding is a loan subject to the state interest rate limit of 24 percent per year for 
a principal amount of more than $1,000 and 33 percent per year for an amount up to 
$1,000. Similarly, in 2009, the Kansas Office of the State Bank Commissioner opined 
that funding is a loan under the state consumer credit code. The code restricts the interest 
rate to 21 percent per year for the amount of the total owed that is more than $860 and 
36 percent per year for the amount of the total owed that is under $860.  
     4.3 Disclosure Law 
 The purpose of a disclosure law is to help consumers understand the true cost of 
nonrecourse loans and make rational, utility-maximizing decisions to obtain these loans. 
Maine, Ohio, and Nebraska have enacted disclosure statutes to govern funding. These 
laws require measures such as a minimum font size, itemization of one-time fees, 
presentation of a schedule of repayments, disclosure of the APR, and translation of the 
contract into the consumer’s primary language. In 2005, the New York State Attorney 
General entered into an agreement with nine financiers that contains disclosure 
requirements similar to those in the funding statutes. All current and new members of the 
American Legal Finance Association (“ALFA”)—a trade association for consumer 
litigation funders—have to comply with this agreement (ALFA 2016). 
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 Disclosure laws theoretically decrease the total number of nonrecourse loans. 
Financiers incur extra expenses in complying with such laws, making it more costly to do 
business. Consumers often are not financially sophisticated (Beydler 2012, p. 1166). 
Thus, disclosure requirements may help consumers comprehend the terms of the contract 
and lead them to decide that the costs of taking out a cash advance outweigh the benefits. 
On a practical note, these requirements may have no actual effect on funding. Many 
financiers supported disclosure measures in lieu of the more restrictive alternative of 
interest or fee caps (Appelbaum 2011a, 2011b). Further, many consumers are financially 
desperate (Garber 2010, p. 10, 12; Martin 2008, p. 84–85; Beydler 2012, p. 1166) and 
may not be motivated to forgo funding, even with new information from the disclosures.  
     4.4 Acknowledgment 
 In two states where the three aforementioned categories do not apply, there have 
been judicial acknowledgments of funding. An acknowledgment (or implicit allowance) 
of nonrecourse advances occurs when a state court does not restrict these advances under 
usury laws or prohibitions against champerty and maintenance. Acknowledgments are 
comparable to legislature legalizations. They reduce litigation costs for financiers and 
thus increase the supply of legal finance. 
5. Conceptual Framework 
State actions should affect the aggregate number of nonrecourse advances. These 
advances, in turn, should affect litigation outcomes. In this paper, claim payment and 
claim duration are the “end outcomes” that I examine. There are two mechanisms through 
which nonrecourse advances affect the end outcomes: bargaining and filing. In this 
Section, I do not introduce a formal model, but I provide a framework for thinking about 
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how funding affects claim payment and claim duration. First, I explain how nonrecourse 
loans can affect the end outcomes through bargaining dynamics, under the assumption 
that filing is constant. Then, I address how funding can impact the end outcomes through 
filing.  
Assuming that filing is constant, litigation finance can increase or decrease claim 
payment and claim duration by changing bargaining dynamics. On one hand, funding can 
boost the plaintiff’s bargaining power because it can shift risk to the financier and lower 
the plaintiff’s discount rate. A plaintiff values trial at the present value of the expected 
judgment from trial minus the risk premium (i.e., (1/(1+r)t)EJ – R). A higher length of 
time to the resolution of the case at trial, t, decreases the present value of the expected 
judgment. A higher discount rate, r, reflects a less patient plaintiff. A higher risk 
premium, R, reflects a more risk averse plaintiff. The plaintiff is indifferent between 
settling for (1/(1+r)t)EJ – R and going to trial. Theoretically, legal finance (“LF”) can 
decrease the risk premium by shifting the risk from the plaintiff to the repeat-player 
funder (i.e., R > RLF) and can reduce the discount rate by providing a cash advance to the 
plaintiff for current living expenses (i.e., r > rLF). Thus, a nonrecourse loan can increase 
the value at which the plaintiff is indifferent between settlement and trial. Under this 
scenario, funding would likely increase claim duration. Plaintiffs who are less risk averse 
and have more monetary resources can hold out for higher settlements or trial awards.  
While funding can increase both claim payment and claim duration, legal scholars 
have raised the possibility of the opposite outcome (Molot 2010, p. 89–91; Rodak 2006, 
p. 522–23). High interest and fees associated with nonrecourse loans may incentivize 
plaintiffs to resolve their cases faster and, perhaps, for a lower amount than they would 
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have gotten without funding. Under this scenario, the risk-transfer benefit is negated due 
to the pressure the plaintiff experiences from the rapid accumulation of interest owed to 
the funder. That is, the plaintiff’s discount rate with funding is actually higher than 
without (i.e., r < rLF). A rational plaintiff would likely not obtain a cash advance unless 
the advance relieved some financial pressure, allowing him to be more patient in waiting 
for a fair settlement. However, Skiba and Xiao (forthcoming) have explained that 
plaintiffs may make cognitive mistakes in their cost-benefit analyses of taking out 
nonrecourse loans.     
Finally, nonrecourse loans can increase claim payment and decrease claim 
duration. Litigation finance may encourage defendants to offer fair deals earlier by 
making plaintiffs’ trial threats more credible (Rodak 2006, p. 522–23). In this scenario, 
negotiations may resolve sooner without any detrimental effect on the magnitude of the 
plaintiff’s settlement.   
Next, this Section discusses how funding can impact claim payment and claim 
duration through the mechanism of filing. A plaintiff will initiate a claim if his expected 
benefits are greater than his expected costs of filing. Assume that the plaintiff’s expected 
benefits are his share of the claim payment (i.e., [(1/(1+r)t)EJ – R](1–α)), and his 
expected filing costs are CF, which may include search costs for an attorney. The constant 
α represents the share that the contingency fee attorney receives. Without funding, the 
expected benefits may be lower than the expected costs (i.e., [(1/(1+r)t)EJ – R](1–
α) < CF). Funding may increase the expected benefits, by reducing the discount rate and 
risk premium, so that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs (i.e., 
[(1/(1+rLF)t)EJ – RLF](1–α) > CF). How funding affects the mean claim payment and mean 
 20 
claim duration through filing depends on the characteristics of the additional claims. If 
the additional claims have an average payment that is higher than the status quo, then the 
overall mean payment will increase, and vice versa. If the additional claims have an 
average duration that is higher than the status quo, then the overall mean duration will 
increase, and vice versa. 
While funding may increase the number of lawsuits, it should not decrease the 
number of lawsuits. A financier does not advance the plaintiff cash until the plaintiff has 
contracted with an attorney and the financier has verified the viability of the case with the 
attorney (see Rodak 2006, p. 519). The attorney has his own participation constraint and 
will not take on a case if his expected share of the lawsuit proceeds is lower than his 
expected litigation costs (i.e., [(1/(1+rLF)t)EJ – RLF]α < CL). If a plaintiff applies for 
funding prior to hiring an attorney, then the financier will ask the plaintiff to first obtain 
legal representation. The financier will not approve the application unless an attorney 
takes the case. 
Table 2 summarizes how each type of state action is predicted to impact the mean 
claim payment and mean claim duration and through what potential mechanisms. 
Because consumer litigation funding can positively or negatively impact the end 
outcomes, the subsequent empirical analysis is important. With the available data, I 
examine the effects of the state actions on claim payment and claim duration. While the 
data also allow me to examine the filing rate, it does not allow me to examine bargaining. 
Thus, I am unable to empirically disentangle the mechanisms through which funding 
affects the end outcomes.  
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6. Data and Empirical Specifications 
     6.1 Data 
The data come primarily from the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) 
Public Access File, which includes all medical malpractice payments since 1991. The 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152) and its 
associated regulations (45 C.F.R. § 60) require that these payments be reported to the 
Department of Health and Human Services within 30 days of payment. Claims that are 
still open, or which were closed without payment, are not included in the NPDB. This 
study uses the data from claims initiated after 2003 since certain individual-level 
characteristics such as patient age, patient gender, and severity of injury are not available 
prior to 2004.12 Also, I examine only claims initiated in 2004–2012 because a low 
percentage of claims initiated in 2013–2016 have been closed.  
     6.1.1 Outcomes of Interest and State Actions  
The outcomes of interest are claim payment, claim duration, and the filing rate. 
Table 3 presents the means of these variables. The NPDB reports the claim payment (i.e., 
the amount paid in the resolution of the claim) as the midpoint of a range. For example, 
payments from $101 to $500 are coded as $300. Imprecision in claim payment will not 
bias the coefficients of the independent variables of interest because the measurement 
error is likely uncorrelated with these variables (Wooldridge 2009, p. 316). The NPDB 
reports the year of the medical incident and year of claim resolution. I define claim 
duration to be the year of resolution minus the year of incident.  
                                                
12 I drop a small number of post-2004 observations that are missing patient gender, patient age, practitioner 
age, or severity of the injury. 
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Filing is a potential mechanism through which funding may affect claim payment 
and claim duration. The NPDB data are imperfect and, as noted above, contain only 
closed claims with positive payments. I use the total number of claims in the data as a 
proxy for the actual number of filings.13 I construct an outcome variable equal to filings 
by state-year per 100,000 residents (see Lee et al. 1994). I create another outcome 
variable equal to filings by state-year per 1,000 physicians (see Avraham 2007). The 
filing rate per 100,000 residents may better reflect the litigiousness of the population, and 
the filing rate per 1,000 physicians may better capture the cost of funding on healthcare 
practitioners.  
 The independent variables of interest are the four state action categories described 
in Section 4: prohibition, interest or fee cap, disclosure law, and acknowledgment. In 
constructing variables corresponding to these categories, I aim for a conservative 
estimate. For the prohibition, I define a variable that equals one for claims in Ohio that 
were initiated in 2004–2008 and resolved before 2009. This definition accounts for the 
possibility that a plaintiff can apply for a nonrecourse loan at any point in the case. The 
plaintiffs that were involved in claims resolved after 2008 had an opportunity to obtain a 
cash advance. I classify claims in Ohio that were initiated in 2004–2008 and resolved 
after 2008 under the disclosure law variable because Ohio implemented a funding statute 
with disclosure provisions in 2008. Unfortunately, for the state-level regressions, I cannot 
be as precise in the formulation of the state action variables and include all claims 
initiated in Ohio in 2004–2008 in the prohibition category. 
                                                
13 The National Center for State Courts reported the 2014 medical malpractice filing rates for fourteen 
states (NCSC 2014). Among these fourteen, the average filing rate was 5.8 filings per 100,000 people—
almost twice the average closed claim rate found in this dataset (i.e., 3.10 claims per 100,000 people). 
Thus, any empirical finding should be a lower bound of the effect of funding on the filing rate.  
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For the remaining categories (i.e., cap on interest or fees, disclosure law, and 
acknowledgment), I create variables that equal one beginning in the year after the state 
actions occurred. For example, an appellate court in North Carolina subjected funding to 
state usury law in 2008. I code the state action variable to reflect that the ruling took 
effect in North Carolina starting in 2009. If prior claims were also affected, then the 
coefficients would be underestimates of the true effects. Since Maine’s disclosure statute 
was enacted on January 1, 2008, I code the state action variable to reflect the law starting 
to impact Maine in 2008.  
     6.1.2 Other Laws, Individual-Level Controls, and State-Level Controls 
 First, in my empirical analysis, I account for other legal changes. Specifically, I 
create an indicator variable that equals one for states that still have a common law or 
statutory prohibition against champerty and maintenance.14 As noted in Section 4.1, this 
variable controls for any effects that champerty and maintenance laws may have on 
litigation outcomes through a non-funding mechanism. I also control for five tort 
reforms: (1) noneconomic damages cap, (2) punitive damages cap, (3) total damages cap, 
(4) joint and several liability reform, and (5) collateral source rule reform. To code these 
five reforms, I employ information in Avraham’s Database of Tort Law Reforms 
(5th edition, 2014), which documents tort reforms in all fifty states since the 1980s. Next, 
consumer advocacy organizations have analogized nonrecourse loans to payday loans 
                                                
14 I opt for broad inclusion in creating this variable; I include any state for which I found a statute or an un-
overruled court opinion with doctrines against champerty and maintenance (or an un-overruled court 
opinion with a general public policy that may enable a claim on the basis of champerty and maintenance). 
The variable includes these states: Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
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because both are last-resort alternative credit products (Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). A 
payday loan is a one-to-two week cash advance of less than $1,000; a consumer can 
qualify for such a loan if he has proof of income and a bank account. Since consumer 
advocacy organizations consider payday loans to be very similar to (and thus a potential 
substitute for) funding, I control for access to payday lending. I draw information from 
Morgan et al. (2012), Bhutta (2014), the Consumer Federation of America’s website 
(CFA 2016), and Westlaw to form a variable to account for state laws that expressly 
prohibit payday loans or have interest rate or fee caps that make it unprofitable for 
lenders to offer these loans (“effective payday loan bans”).  
Second, I use the NPDB data to create indicator variables to account for 
individual-level characteristics. Table 3 presents these variables, along with their means, 
and marks the omitted category. I control for patient gender, patient age, severity of the 
injury, practitioner age, practitioner graduation year, type of malpractice allegation, and 
practitioner field of license. Further, I construct indicator variables that equal one if there 
was a judgment (instead of a settlement) and if there was a state fund payment.15  
 Finally, I create state-level controls and match them to the NPDB data by state 
and incident year.16 Table 3 reports the means of these controls. The demographics, 
unemployment rate, and income per capita account for the potential characteristics of the 
injured party and economic conditions that may affect medical malpractice litigation. The 
                                                
15 Some states have funds that make payment in addition to the malpractice insurer’s payment if the 
settlement or judgment is higher than the maximum amount dictated in the law regarding payment by the 
primary insurer.  
16 The state-level data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate), Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (income per capita), American Bar Association (number of lawyers per 100,000 people), Area 
Health Resources Files (number of physicians per 100,000 people), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ National Health Expenditure Data (health expenditures per capita), and National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (number of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 
people). 
 25 
lawyer and physician variables account for access to and competition among these 
professionals. Health expenditures per capita reflect medical care costs and extent of 
utilization, and the fatality rate controls for trends in events that necessitate care.  
     6.2 Empirical Specifications 
This paper employs a difference-in-differences estimation approach. This strategy 
identifies the effect of consumer legal funding on litigation outcomes by using variations 
in the timing and geography of funding state laws. In all of the regressions, I cluster 
standard errors by state in order to avoid difference-in-differences estimation problems 
related to serial correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004). 
For all of the following equations, I am interested in the effects of the state actions 
that are captured by the coefficients β1, β2, β3, and β4. I will first examine how funding 
affects claim payment and claim duration. Then, I will explore whether funding impacts 
the filing rate. Below, other laws include prohibitions against champerty and 
maintenance, tort reforms, and effective payday lending bans. Individual-level controls 
include patient, practitioner, injury, and case characteristics. State-level controls account 
for state demographics, economic conditions, and other factors that may affect medical 
malpractice lawsuits. All equations incorporate year fixed effects to account for time 
trends and state fixed effects to control for time-invariant characteristics of the states.    
First, to examine claim payment for claim i, state s, and year t, I estimate the 
following ordinary least squares equation: 
(1) Log(Claim Paymentist) = α + β1Prohibitionst + β2Interest or Fee Capst  
+ β3Disclosure Lawst + β4Acknowledgmentst + ΣcτcOther Lawsst + ΣhγhIndividual-
Level Controlsi + ΣjλjState-Level Controlsst + ΣtδtYeart + ΣsµsStates + εist. 
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Second, I follow Ho and Liu (2011a) and employ the Cox Proportional Hazards Model, a 
type of duration analysis, to study the effects of the state actions on the claim duration 
hazard rate for claim i, state s, and year t: 
(2) h(t, X, α, β, τ, γ, λ, δ, µ) = h0(t)exp(α + β1Prohibitionst + β2Interest or Fee Capst  + 
β3Disclosure Lawst + β4Acknowledgmentst + ΣcτcOther Lawsst + ΣhγhIndividual-
Level Controlsi + ΣjλjState-Level Controlsst + ΣtδtYeart + ΣsµsStates).  
The h(t, X, α, β, τ, γ, λ, δ, µ) is the hazard rate, which is the probability that the claim will 
be resolved at t years (i.e., the claim duration), conditional on the claim not being 
resolved yet. Note that the hazard rate is inversely related to the claim duration; that is, a 
higher hazard rate indicates a lower claim duration. The baseline hazard function is h0(t). 
Under the Cox Proportional Hazards Model, the baseline hazard function need not be 
specified, and it can be any function of t as long as h0(t) ≥ 0.17  
The actual effects of the state actions on claim payment and claim duration 
depend on which theories, discussed in Section 5, dominate. If the plaintiff’s discount 
rate and risk premium both decrease or cases with a higher average claim payment and 
longer average claim duration are filed with funding, then in equation (1), β1, β2, and β3 
should be negative, and β4 should be positive; in equation (2), β1, β2, and β3 should be 
positive, and β4 should be negative (because claim duration is inversely related to the 
hazard rate). If the plaintiff’s risk-transfer benefit is negated by a discount rate increase or 
cases with a lower average claim payment and shorter average claim duration are filed 
                                                
17 In the Cox Proportional Hazards Model, the hazards are proportional to each other, and the estimates of 
the coefficients are not dependent on time.  That is: 
h(t, xi1,..., xin,α,β,τ,λ,δ,µ)
h(t, x j1,..., x jn,α,β,τ,λ,δ,µ)
=
h0 (t)exp(α +β1xi1 +...)
h0 (t)exp(α +β1x j1 +...)
= exp{β1(xi1 − x j1)+...} .  
Accordingly, exp(β1) is the hazard ratio associated with a one-unit increase in x1. 
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with funding, then in equation (1), β1, β2, and β3 should be positive, and β4 should be 
negative; in equation (2), β1, β2, and β3 should be negative, and β4 should be positive. If 
the defendant is more willing to make a fair offer sooner (with funding), then in 
equations (1) and (2), β1, β2, and β3 should be negative, and β4 should be positive. 
Third, I examine whether the filing rate changed as a result of the different state 
actions. Empirical analysis of filings can shed light on a mechanism through which 
nonrecourse advances affect claim payment and claim duration. This paper explores the 
impact of funding on the filing rate for state s and year t by estimating the following 
ordinary least squares equation: 
(3) Filing Ratest = α + β1Prohibitionst + β2Interest or Fee Capst + β3Disclosure Lawst  
+ β4Acknowledgmentst + ΣcτcOther Lawsst + ΣjλjState-Level Controlsst + ΣtδtYeart 
+ ΣsµsStates + εst, 
in which filing rate can be per 100,000 residents or per 1,000 physicians. If funding 
increases the filing rate, then in equation (3), β1, β2, and β3 should be negative, and β4 
should be positive. 
7. Results  
     7.1 Claim Payment and Claim Duration 
In Tables 4 and 5, column (1) presents the effects of the four categories of state 
actions with state and year fixed effects. Columns (2) to (4) account for other laws. 
Columns (3) and (4) include individual-level controls, and column (4) adds state-level 
controls. Table 4 reports the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
log of claim payment. The Ohio prohibition has a significant effect in all four columns. 
With all controls, the prohibition decreased claim payment by approximately 
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18 percentage points or $54,467.18 All of the other state actions have insignificant effects 
once the individual-level controls are added. However, the coefficients on the state action 
variables are jointly significant at the one percent level, even for the regression with all 
controls.19 
Table 5 reports the hazard ratios that come from the Cox regressions. The hazard 
ratio is the hazard rate of the claims affected by the state action divided by that of the 
claims not affected by the state action. A hazard ratio greater than one reflects a positive 
beta in equation (2) for that state action, and a hazard ratio less than one reflects a 
negative beta in equation (2) for that state action. A hazard ratio greater than one 
indicates that claims affected by the state action resolve faster (i.e., claim duration is 
shorter); a hazard ratio less than one shows that claims affected by the state action resolve 
slower (i.e., claim duration is longer). The results for the prohibition in Ohio and 
acknowledgment, which occurred in Florida and Texas, are robust across the four 
columns. With all controls, the prohibition caused claims to resolve 3.4 times faster. This 
implies that the prohibition decreased claim duration. With all controls, acknowledgment 
caused the probability a claim resolves at t years, conditional on it not being resolved yet, 
to decrease by 15 percent. This implies that acknowledgment increased claim duration. 
Column (3) shows that the probability a claim resolves at t years, conditional on it not 
being resolved yet, increased by 10 percent when a disclosure law was in place. 
However, this effect disappears once state-level controls are added in column (4).  
                                                
18 Because the dependent variable is the log of claim payment and the state action categories are indicator 
variables, I obtain the marginal effect by subtracting one from the exponentiation of the coefficient. I 
calculate the average dollar amount of the decrease by taking the average claim payment of the claims not 
covered by the Ohio prohibition ($302,592) and multiplying this number by the percentage point effect 
(0.18). 
19 Table A1 shows the full results of the regressions with all controls in Tables 4 to 7. 
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     7.2 Filing Rate 
In Tables 6 and 7, column (1) presents the effects of the four categories of state 
actions with state and year fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) add controls for other laws. 
Column (3) includes state-level controls. Table 6 depicts the results of regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the number of claims per 100,000 residents. With all 
controls, there were approximately 1.2 fewer claims per 100,000 people as a result of the 
Ohio prohibition, and 0.34 more claims per 100,000 people as the result of an 
acknowledgment, which occurred in Florida and Texas. Table 7 reports the findings of 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the number of claims per 1,000 physicians. 
With all controls, the prohibition decreased claims by 3.6 per 1,000 physicians, and an 
acknowledgment increased claims by 1.6 per 1,000 physicians.  
8. Robustness Checks 
     8.1 Claim Duration 
The Cox regressions drop all observations for which the claim duration is zero 
years. Claim duration is defined as the year of resolution minus the year of incident; thus, 
having a duration of zero years means that the resolution occurred in the same year as the 
incident. To check that the zero-value observations do not alter the results, I change the 
zero values to 0.01923 years (1 week), 0.33 years, 0.67 years, and 1 year and then run the 
Cox regressions again. Table A2 reports the results, which are very similar to those in 
Table 5.  
     8.2 Endogeneity 
Funding-related state actions affect litigation outcomes. However, litigation 
outcomes may affect the existence of state actions. Therefore, endogeneity may be a 
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concern. To address this issue, I attempt to instrument for the state actions by using 
campaign contributions data for several industries, the dominant political party of the 
state legislature, and the political party of the state governor. Previously, scholars have 
used political variables to instrument for tort reform (see, e.g., Avraham 2007; Rubin and 
Shepherd 2007; Durrance 2010). Thus, these variables may work as instruments for 
funding-related state actions.  
Campaign contributions data come from the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics (NIMSP 2016). The Institute collects data from the mandatory disclosure filings 
that donors make for all state primary and general elections. It classifies the donors by 
their affiliated industry groups. From the Institute’s website, I download contributions 
data of the insurance, health, lawyers and lobbyists, and financial institutions industries.20 
The insurance industry is one of the legal funding industry’s biggest lobbying opponents. 
As plaintiffs file more claims or hold out for higher settlements, insurance companies’ 
profits will fall. Lawyers and lobbyists care about nonrecourse advances because these 
advances influence plaintiff participation in lawsuits. Health industry groups care about 
litigation finance because as plaintiffs gain higher settlements, insurance premiums will 
rise and the number of available insurance options will decrease. Other financial 
institutions care because funders are their competitors in providing credit to consumers. I 
create total-dollar contributions variables for these four industries for the election year 
and also one-year, two-year, and three-year lags. Further, I construct cumulative 
                                                
20 The health industry includes health professionals, health services, hospitals and nursing homes, 
pharmaceuticals and health products, and miscellaneous health-related groups. The financial institutions 
industry includes banks and lending institutions, commercial banks, credit unions, finance and credit 
companies, payday/title loans, and savings and loans groups (NIMSP 2016).  
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contributions variables (e.g., election year plus the previous year, election year plus the 
previous two years, etc.).  
I obtain data on state legislature and governor party affiliation for years 2004 to 
2011 from Carl Klarner’s open access databases (Klarner 2013a, 2013b) and for the year 
2012 from the National Conference of State Legislatures partisan composition tables 
(Warnock 2016). From the raw data, I form two indicator variables. The state legislature 
indicator equals one if Democrats dominate both state legislative houses in that year. The 
state governor indicator equals one if the governor was a Democrat in that year.  
 I run regressions and conduct statistical tests using several combinations of the 
political contributions and party affiliation variables. Unfortunately, all combinations 
yield extremely low Cragg-Donald (or, if robust standard errors, Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald) statistics of less than three. This means that the instrumental variables (“IVs”) are 
extremely weak, and the IV regressions may be extremely biased (with a potential 
relative bias of over 30 percent) (Bound et al. 1995; Stock and Yogo 2005). Thus, due to 
the weak instrument problem, the results of my IV regressions are not reliable, and I do 
not report them. Avraham (2007) experienced similar problems with his IV analysis 
involving multiple potentially endogenous tort reforms and reported that he had no choice 
but to abandon his IV analysis.  
While endogeneity is a possibility, there are four reasons to believe that the 
problem is not significant in this study. First, the litigation outcomes studied are for 
medical malpractice, but the state actions are not specific to medical malpractice cases. 
The connection between medical malpractice lawsuit outcomes and state actions related 
to the funding of all torts is therefore attenuated (see similar rationale for tort reforms in 
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Avraham 2007, p. S214, and Frakes and Jena 2016, p. 155). Second, judicial decisions 
and agency enforcement orders are more likely to be exogenous than legislature actions 
because courts and agencies are less prone to the influence of interest groups (see similar 
rationale for tort reforms in Avraham 2007, p. S214; see also Epstein 1990, p. 841; 
Fesler 1940, p. 942). During the time period 2004–2012, most of the state actions are not 
legislative but instead come from judges or agencies. This may in fact be the reason that 
the political contributions and party affiliation IVs perform so poorly. 
Third, the significant results concern the prohibition and acknowledgment 
categories. Regarding the prohibition, the Ohio Supreme Court sua sponte used the 
champerty and maintenance doctrines to ban funding as neither party had raised the 
claim. Further, no amici had petitioned the court to apply these doctrines. On appeal, 
from the perspective of the parties, the worst possible outcome facing the funders was 
invalidation of the transactions at hand under state usury laws and allowance for future 
transactions that complied with such laws. Thus, it was a surprise that the court expressly 
prohibited legal finance. Regarding the Florida and Texas acknowledgments, for the 
chain of reverse causality to work (i.e., lawsuit outcomes cause state actions), observing 
litigation outcomes that confirm nonrecourse loans’ effects on the court system (i.e., 
plaintiffs’ awards and claim durations increasing) should prompt courts to limit funding, 
not leave it unrestricted (see similar argument for tort reform in Avraham 2007, p. S214).  
Finally, Table A3 reports the results of regressions that examine the effects of 
state-level characteristics on the existence of funding-related state actions. The first 
dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a state action of any kind affects that 
state-year; the second dependent variable equals one if the prohibition is in effect, two if 
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an interest rate or fee cap is in effect, three if a disclosure law is in effect, four if an 
acknowledgment is in effect, and zero if no state action is in effect. All of the 
demographic, socioeconomic, and political variables have insignificant effects. This 
provides evidence that no endogeneity bias comes from these factors. 
     8.3 Effect of the Great Recession and Bootstrap Standard Errors  
 I examine the effect of an increase in the supply of legal finance that resulted 
from the Great Recession. The financial crisis prompted hedge funds and other investors 
to funnel their capital into funding because lawsuit outcomes are not correlated with the 
market (Steinitz 2011, p. 1283–84). I account for this capital increase with a post-2007 
indicator because the National Bureau of Economic Research defined the start of the 
recession to be December 2007 (NBER 2010). While an increase in funding should 
increase claim payment, claim duration, and the filing rate, the Great Recession may have 
affected litigation outcomes in a negative way since many people experienced adverse 
financial events during this time.  
Table A4 reports the results. The coefficients on the state action categories 
resemble the ones in the main regressions. The post-2007 variable is associated with 
shorter claim duration and a lower filing rate per 1,000 physicians. This suggests that 
though the number of nonrecourse loans increased, the monetary benefits of funding were 
not able to keep financially desperate consumers afloat during this period, leading them 
to accept settlements sooner. Also, the increase in funding likely was not enough to 
incentivize financially troubled households to initiate medical malpractice claims, 
resulting in a filing decrease.  
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 Finally, because the number of policy changes in each category is very small (see 
Conley and Taber 2011), I estimate all regressions with bootstrap standard errors.21 For 
the most part, the significant effects in Tables 4 to 7 remain significant in the regressions 
with bootstrap standard errors. 22  The exception is that the coefficients on 
acknowledgment in both filing rate regressions become insignificant, though the 
magnitudes and signs remain the same. I cannot discern whether this is a result of the 
small sample size at the state-year level (N=450) or the small number of policy changes. 
With a small sample size, the filing rate regressions may not have enough power to 
sustain significance with the bootstrap standard errors. 
9. Discussion 
 In deciding how to best govern consumer litigation funding, policymakers should 
examine the costs and benefits of this practice. This study may shed light on such 
considerations. The Ohio prohibition decreased claim payment by 18 percentage points 
and caused claims to resolve 3.4 times faster (shorter claim duration). The prohibition 
also reduced claims by 1.2 per 100,000 people and 3.6 per 1,000 physicians. Judicial 
acknowledgment, which occurred in Florida and Texas, caused claims to resolve 15 
percent slower (longer claim duration). Acknowledgment also increased claims by 0.34 
per 100,000 people and 1.6 per 1,000 physicians, but these two effects are not robust to 
bootstrap standard errors. Acknowledgment has effects of a lower magnitude than those 
of prohibition and has no effect on claim payment. This is likely because funders already 
                                                
21 Bootstrapping is a nonparametric method of estimating the distribution of a parameter through random 
resampling. A bootstrap sample is created when one draws with replacement N observations from the N-
observation dataset. The formula for computing a bootstrap standard error is 
seˆ = {(1/ (k −1)) (θˆi −θ )2}1/2∑ , where θˆi  is the parameter calculated using the i-th bootstrap sample, θ  is 
the average of the bootstrap calculations, and k is the number of replications. 
22 The bootstrap results are available upon request. 
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operate in states with no state actions. While the prohibition caused funders to completely 
cease their operations, acknowledgment changed the status quo very little. 
 The results related to claim payment and claim duration are consistent with the 
theory that nonrecourse loans benefit plaintiffs by decreasing their discount rates and risk 
premiums so that they can hold out for higher settlements. This paper also provides 
evidence that funding is changing plaintiffs’ filing calculus, by reducing plaintiffs’ 
discount rates and risk premiums, so that the expected benefits of filing are greater than 
the expected costs. This is plausible because financiers elicit consumers via television 
and Internet advertisements. Plaintiffs may see these advertisements and learn about 
funding prior to obtaining legal representation and filing claims, even if they enter into 
agreements with financiers after their cases have commenced. Unfortunately, with the 
available data, I am unable to disentangle the mechanisms through which funding affects 
claim payment and claim duration. Although I find that funding increased the filing rate, I 
am unable to determine whether the additional claims had an average claim payment and 
average claim duration that were different than the status quo. 
The filing results suggest that a cost of legal finance to medical practitioners may 
be an increase in malpractice liability risk. Higher liability risk is associated with higher 
insurance premiums (see, e.g., Viscusi and Born 2005), defensive medicine (see, e.g., 
Currie and Macleod 2008), and potentially undesirable shifts in the physician labor 
market (see, e.g., Matsa 2007). An increase in litigation alone is not enough of a 
justification to prohibit funding. This study does not resolve the question of whether the 
benefits to plaintiffs outweigh costs to medical practitioners. Funding may precipitate 
more filings because plaintiffs’ risk aversion and income constraints were previously 
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barriers to the courts. Thus, in a regime without funding, there may be under-filing, 
under-compensation of plaintiffs, and suboptimal deterrence of defendants. Policymakers 
should consider the increase in liability risk when evaluating funding, but they should 
not, without further cost-benefit analysis, ban this financial product. 
Another interesting finding is that effective payday loan bans have no significant 
impact in any of the regressions that control for other laws. When calling for funding 
regulation, consumer advocacy organizations have continuously contended that funding 
should be regulated in the way that payday lending is. Skiba and Xiao (forthcoming) 
argued that funding’s relationship with litigation not only distinguishes it from payday 
lending but also provides a rationale for a policy approach that differs from the one used 
to regulate payday lending. As payday lending does not affect medical malpractice 
litigation outcomes (but funding does), this paper provides some empirical support for 
Skiba and Xiao’s argument that funding’s tie to litigation makes it unique and less 
comparable to payday loans. 
 With all controls, the coefficients on the interest or fee cap category are not 
significant for any of the litigation outcomes. One reason may be that caps on interest or 
fees do not affect medical malpractice lawsuit funding but impact the financing of other 
types of tort cases. Another reason may be that a lack of publicity and the possibility of a 
future overruling caused firms to do little to respond to the interest or fee caps. In 2004–
2012, the state actions involving caps were two lower court opinions and two agency 
rulings. Financiers may have believed that there was a reasonable probability that the 
points of law in the lower court opinions would be overturned at the state supreme court 
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level in subsequent cases. Funders also may not have known about the court opinions or 
agency actions, as they were not statutes.  
With all controls, the coefficients on the disclosure law category are not 
significant for any of the litigation outcomes. In contrast to interest or fee caps, disclosure 
provisions were passed by statute or part of a binding agreement. Thus, I cannot attribute 
the lack of significance to a dearth of publicity or the probability of an overruling. 
Instead, the provisions did not significantly impact litigation outcomes likely because 
financiers and consumers did not appreciably change their behavior. Such an explanation 
would be consistent with the previous literature on disclosure laws, which shows that 
these laws often do not achieve their intended goals of informing consumers and 
improving decision-making (see Ben-Shahar and Schneider 2011, p. 665–78).  
 Finally, this paper has several limitations. This study examines only medical 
malpractice claims. Next, as noted before, the data contain only closed claims with 
positive payments. The number of claims by state and year, created from this data, only 
serves as an approximation of the number of filings. Endogeneity also may be a problem, 
though probably a small one as explained in Section 8.2. 
10. Conclusion 
 Consumer litigation funding is a growing business in the United States—one that 
state policymakers have increasingly scrutinized. This paper is the first to empirically 
examine this alternative credit source. It draws on 2004–2012 medical malpractice closed 
claim data from the National Practitioner Data Bank. This work employs a difference-in-
differences identification strategy, using state actions that affect demand for, and access 
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to, nonrecourse loans. This study provides evidence that access to funding increases 
claim payment, claim duration, and the filing rate.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions 
State Action State (Time Period) Citation Expected Effect on 
the Number of 
Nonrecourse Loans 
Prohibition 
Ohio (2003–2008) Rancman v. Interim 
Settlement Funding Corp., 
789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) 
Decrease (–) 
Interest Rate/Fee 
Cap 
Michigan (2004–present) Lawsuit Financial, LLC v. 
Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
Decrease (–) 
North Carolina (2008–present) 
 
Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 
665 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008) 
Maryland (2009–present) Maryland Commissioner of 
Financial Regulation,  
DFR-EU 2008-241  
Kansas (2009–present) Kansas Office of the State 
Bank Commissioner, 
Consumer and Mortgage 
Lending Division,  
No. 2009-141 
Disclosure Law 
New York (2005–present) Attorney General of the State 
of New York, Bureau of 
Consumer Frauds and 
Protection, Assurance of 
Discontinuance Pursuant to 
Executive Law §63(15) 
Decrease (–) Maine (2008–present) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9–A, 
§ 12-104 
Ohio (2008–present) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 1349.55 
Nebraska (2010–present) Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.  
§ 25-3303 
Acknowledgment 
Florida (1996–present) Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 
679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) 
Increase (+) Texas (2006–present) Anglo-Dutch Petroleum 
International, Inc. v. Haskell, 
193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. 
App. 2006) 
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Table 2. Expected Effects of State Actions on Claim Payment and Claim Duration  
Litigation End Outcomes and 
Potential Mechanisms 
Prohibition Interest Rate/Fee 
Cap 
Disclosure 
Law 
Acknowledgment 
Mean 
Claim 
Payment 
If the following effects 
dominate: 
(1) the plaintiff’s 
discount rate and risk 
premium both decrease;  
(2) the defendant is more 
willing to make a fair 
offer sooner; and/or 
(3) cases with a higher 
average claim payment 
are filed 
(–) (–) (–) (+) 
If the following effects 
dominate: 
(1) the plaintiff’s risk-
transfer benefit is 
negated by a discount 
rate increase; and/or  
(2) cases with a lower 
average claim payment 
are filed 
(+) (+) (+) (–) 
Mean 
Claim 
Duration 
If the following effects 
dominate: 
(1) the plaintiff’s 
discount rate and risk 
premium both decrease; 
and/or  
(2) cases with a longer 
average claim duration 
are filed 
(–) (–) (–) (+) 
If the following effects 
dominate: 
(1) the plaintiff’s risk-
transfer benefit is 
negated by a discount 
rate increase;  
(2) the defendant is more 
willing to make a fair 
offer sooner; and/or  
(3) cases with a shorter 
average claim duration 
are filed 
(+) (+) (+) (–) 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Outcomes of Interest Mean 
Claim Payment (2016 $) 302,480.90 
Claim Duration (Years) 3.82 
Filings per 100,000 Residents 3.10 
Filings per 1,000 Physicians 11.83 
Individual-Level Controls Mean 
Patient Gender (%) Male Patient† 42.46 
 Female Patient 57.54 
Patient Age (%) Patient under 10† 7.52 
 Patient 10 to 39 Years Old 27.39 
 Patient 40 to 59 Years Old 39.22 
 Patient over 59 Years Old 25.87 
Severity of Injury (%) Insignificant Injury† = 
21.85     Emotional Injury Only,     Insignificant Injury, and 
    Minor Temporary Injury 
 Somewhat Significant Injury = 
37.43     Major Temporary Injury,     Minor Permanent Injury, and 
    Significant Permanent Injury 
 Significant Injury = 
40.72     Major Permanent Injury,     Quadriplegia, Brain Damage, or Life-Long Care, 
    and Death 
Practitioner Age (%) Practitioner Age under 40† 20.29 
 Practitioner Age 40 to 59 59.92 
 Practitioner Age over 59 19.79 
Practitioner Graduation Year (%) Practitioner Graduated Before 1970† 9.71 
 Practitioner Graduated 1970 to 1989 49.83 
 Practitioner Graduated after 1989 40.46 
Type of Malpractice Allegation (%) Treatment Related 28.76 
 Surgery Related 24.72 
 Diagnosis Related 25.66 
 Other† 20.86 
Practitioner Field of License (%) Allopathic and Osteopathic Physician/Resident  74.67 
 Dentistry Related 12.19 
 Eye Related  0.29 
 Podiatry Related 2.11 
 Chiropractor Related 1.54 
 Nursing Related 5.53 
 Physician Assistant 1.35 
 Therapist 0.76 
 Psychology Related 0.16 
 Technician and Technology Related 0.12 
 Other† 1.28 
Other (%) Judgment 1.83 
 Settlement† 98.17 
 State Fund Payment 3.75 
 No State Fund Payment† 96.25 
† Indicates the omitted category.  
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State-Level Controls Mean 
Percent Nonwhite 24.64 
Percent with At Least College Degree 25.03 
Percent over 65 Years Old 16.26 
Percent in Metropolitan Area 72.72 
Unemployment Rate 6.32 
Income per Capita (2016 $) 43,874.16 
Number of Lawyers per 100,000 People 319.47 
Number of Physicians per 100,000 People 274.61 
Health Expenditures per Capita (2016 $) 7,698.84 
Number of Fatal Car Accidents per 1,000,000 People 128.22 
Note: Author’s calculations for the outcomes of interest and individual-level controls are from the National 
Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016). The 
state-level controls are from Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate), Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(income per capita), American Bar Association (number of lawyers per 100,000 people), Area Health 
Resources Files (number of physicians per 100,000 people), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 
National Health Expenditure Data (health expenditures per capita), and National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (number of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people). 
The author calculated the means of claim payment, claim duration, and individual-level controls over 
89,507 individual claims. The author calculated the means of the filing rates and state-level controls over 
450 state-incident year cells.  
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Table 4. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Claim 
Payment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prohibition -0.568*** -0.648*** -0.210*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0412) (0.0266) (0.0409) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.0308 0.0275 0.0310 0.0387 
 (0.0621) (0.0609) (0.0541) (0.0590) 
Disclosure Law -0.0372* -0.0428* -0.0278 -0.0281 
 (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0211) (0.0271) 
Acknowledgment  -0.0594*** -0.0640*** 0.0180 -0.00602 
 (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0185) (0.0306) 
     
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Other Laws  X X X 
Individual-Level Controls   X X 
State-Level Controls    X 
     
Observations 89,507 89,507 89,507 89,507 
R-squared 0.071 0.072 0.398 0.398 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. The 
dependent variable is the log of claim payment. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Other laws 
include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort reforms, and effective payday loan bans. Individual-
level controls include patient gender, patient age, injury severity, practitioner age, practitioner graduation 
cohort, type of malpractice allegation, practitioner field of license, whether there was a judgment, and 
whether there was a state fund payment. State-level demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau include the 
shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 years old, with at least a bachelor’s degree, and live in a 
metropolitan area. Other state-level controls include unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), number of lawyers per 100,000 people (American Bar 
Association), number of physicians per 100,000 people (Area Health Resources Files), health expenditures 
per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National Health Expenditure Data), and number 
of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Claim 
Duration Hazard Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prohibition 3.275*** 3.785*** 3.569*** 3.382*** 
 (0.203) (0.573) (0.530) (0.550) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.953 0.960 0.956 0.942 
 (0.0458) (0.0457) (0.0470) (0.0438) 
Disclosure Law 1.093*** 1.104*** 1.102*** 1.051 
 (0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0309) (0.0425) 
Acknowledgment  0.851*** 0.859*** 0.855*** 0.853*** 
 (0.0346) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0337) 
     
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Other Laws  X X X 
Individual-Level Controls   X X 
State-Level Controls    X 
     
Observations 88,147 88,147 88,147 88,147 
Akaike’s Information Criterion 1854979 1854946 1852550 1852511 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. The numbers 
reported are hazard ratios from Cox regressions. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The Akaike’s 
Information Criterion provides a measure of fit; a smaller number indicates a smaller deviance from the 
empirical model. Other laws include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort reforms, and effective 
payday loan bans. Individual-level controls include patient gender, patient age, injury severity, practitioner 
age, practitioner graduation cohort, type of malpractice allegation, practitioner field of license, whether 
there was a judgment, and whether there was a state fund payment. State-level demographics from the U.S. 
Census Bureau include the shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 years old, with at least a 
bachelor’s degree, and live in a metropolitan area. Other state-level controls include unemployment rate 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics), income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), number of lawyers per 
100,000 people (American Bar Association), number of physicians per 100,000 people (Area Health 
Resources Files), health expenditures per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National 
Health Expenditure Data), and number of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Filing Rate 
per 100,000 Residents 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Prohibition -1.074 -1.057 -1.194* 
 (0.723) (0.733) (0.690) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap -0.150 -0.143 -0.180 
 (0.330) (0.292) (0.347) 
Disclosure Law -0.584 -0.524 -0.520 
 (0.694) (0.698) (0.591) 
Acknowledgment  0.278** 0.337*** 0.338** 
 (0.118) (0.110) (0.150) 
    
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X 
Other Laws  X X 
State-Level Controls   X 
    
Observations 450 450 450 
R-squared 0.793 0.803 0.811 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. The 
dependent variable is the total number of claims at the year-state level per 100,000 people. Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. Other laws include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort 
reforms, and effective payday loan bans. State-level demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau include 
the shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 years old, with at least a bachelor’s degree, and live 
in a metropolitan area. Other state-level controls include unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), number of lawyers per 100,000 people (American Bar 
Association), number of physicians per 100,000 people (Area Health Resources Files), health expenditures 
per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National Health Expenditure Data), and number 
of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Filing Rate 
per 1,000 Physicians 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Prohibition -3.246* -3.209* -3.584* 
 (1.652) (1.685) (1.799) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.198 0.218 -0.0429 
 (1.250) (1.144) (1.305) 
Disclosure Law -0.966 -0.781 -0.999 
 (1.629) (1.645) (1.462) 
Acknowledgment  0.846* 1.025** 1.624** 
 (0.446) (0.419) (0.694) 
    
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X 
Other Laws  X X 
State-Level Controls   X 
    
Observations 450 450 450 
R-squared 0.796 0.831 0.837 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. The 
dependent variable is the total number of claims at the year-state level per 1,000 physicians. Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. Other laws include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort 
reforms, and effective payday loan bans. State-level demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau include 
the shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 years old, with at least a bachelor’s degree, and live 
in a metropolitan area. Other state-level controls include unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 
income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), number of lawyers per 100,000 people (American Bar 
Association), number of physicians per 100,000 people (Area Health Resources Files), health expenditures 
per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National Health Expenditure Data), and number 
of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Full Results of the Claim Payment, Claim Duration Hazard Rate, and 
Filing Rate Regressions with All Controls 
 Log(Claim 
Payment) 
Claim Duration 
Hazard Rate 
Filing Rate 
(Population) 
Filing Rate 
(Physician) 
Prohibition -0.194*** 3.382*** -1.194* -3.584* 
 (0.0409) (0.550) (0.690) (1.799) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.0387 0.942 -0.180 -0.0429 
 (0.0590) (0.0438) (0.347) (1.305) 
Disclosure Law -0.0281 1.051 -0.520 -0.999 
 (0.0271) (0.0425) (0.591) (1.462) 
Acknowledgment  -0.00602 0.853*** 0.338** 1.624** 
 (0.0306) (0.0337) (0.150) (0.694) 
Champerty and Maintenance Law 0.638** 0.568 1.567 7.274 
  (0.239) (0.243) (1.271) (4.501) 
Noneconomic Damages Cap 0.0694 0.914** -0.186 -0.670 
 (0.0528) (0.0411) (0.389) (1.540) 
Punitive Damages Cap -0.117* 1.316 0.144 0.497 
 (0.0598) (0.350) (0.277) (1.067) 
Total Damages Cap 0.721* 0.985 -2.055 -10.45 
 (0.367) (0.428) (2.404) (9.497) 
Joint and Several Liability Reform 0.0515* 0.981 0.302 1.360 
  (0.0284) (0.0354) (0.383) (1.455) 
Collateral Source Rule Reform 0.449* 0.790 -0.192 -4.426 
 (0.249) (0.347) (1.984) (7.850) 
Effective Payday Loan Bans -0.000618 1.018 0.322 0.914 
 (0.0403) (0.0319) (0.405) (1.606) 
Female Patient -0.00258 1.027*** – – 
 (0.0120) (0.00753)   
Patient 10 to 39 Years Old -0.229*** 1.237*** – – 
 (0.0370) (0.0439)   
Patient 40 to 59 Years Old -0.213*** 1.230*** – – 
 (0.0416) (0.0473)   
Patient over 59 Years Old -0.487*** 1.291*** – – 
 (0.0488) (0.0467)   
Somewhat Significant Injury 1.255*** 0.865*** – – 
 (0.0322) (0.0163)   
Significant Injury 1.846*** 0.831*** – – 
 (0.0603) (0.0199)   
Practitioner Age 40 to 59 0.0370** 0.982 – – 
 (0.0165) (0.0121)   
Practitioner Age over 59 -0.00999 1.009 – – 
 (0.0335) (0.0242)   
Practitioner Graduated 1970 to 1989 0.00948 1.008 – – 
  (0.0250) (0.0169)   
Practitioner Graduated after 1989 0.0139 0.974 – – 
  (0.0257) (0.0177)   
Malpractice Allegation:  -0.0606** 0.966*** – – 
 Treatment Related (0.0245) (0.0120)   
Malpractice Allegation:  0.230*** 1.009 – – 
 Surgery Related (0.0207) (0.0113)   
Malpractice Allegation:  0.178*** 0.901*** – – 
 Diagnosis Related (0.0223) (0.0149)   
Field of License: Allopathic and  0.976*** 0.767*** – – 
 56 
 Osteopathic Physician/Resident (0.0867) (0.0376)   
Field of License: Dentistry Related 0.142** 0.913* – – 
  (0.0688) (0.0429)   
Field of License: Eye Related 0.631*** 0.780*** – – 
 (0.129) (0.0449)   
Field of License: Podiatry Related 0.896*** 0.776*** – – 
  (0.102) (0.0405)   
Field of License: Chiropractor Related 0.341*** 1.132** – – 
  (0.126) (0.0623)   
Field of License: Nursing Related 0.461*** 0.770*** – – 
  (0.125) (0.0339)   
Field of License: Physician Assistant 0.586*** 0.810*** – – 
 (0.0952) (0.0384)   
Field of License: Therapist 0.318** 1.154*** – – 
 (0.123) (0.0615)   
Field of License: Psychology Related 0.958*** 0.632*** – – 
  (0.133) (0.0709)   
Field of License: Technician and 0.663*** 0.859 – – 
 Technology Related (0.154) (0.0795)   
Judgment 0.504*** 0.706*** – – 
 (0.0687) (0.0288)   
State Fund Payment 0.555*** 0.777*** – – 
 (0.128) (0.0392)   
Percent of Population Nonwhite -1.486* 0.525 -5.160 -25.80 
 (0.845) (0.536) (5.257) (21.56) 
Percent with At Least College Degree -1.189 3.509 7.599 27.45 
      (1.055) (4.774) (5.199) (19.20) 
Percent over 65 Years Old -0.512 0.557 -0.0328 -2.667 
 (1.628) (0.937) (6.772) (26.13) 
Percent in Metropolitan Area -0.168 1.046 1.792 6.559 
 (0.395) (0.598) (2.798) (11.78) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0232* 0.994 -0.102 -0.0106 
 (0.0135) (0.0192) (0.0796) (0.274) 
Income per Capita -3.38e-06 1.000 -7.11e-05 -0.000239 
 (9.37e-06) (8.96e-06) (4.94e-05) (0.000177) 
Number of Lawyers per 100,000 -0.000152 1.000 -4.44e-05 0.000497 
 People (0.000261) (0.000642) (0.00548) (0.0135) 
Number of Physicians per 100,000 0.000408 0.999 -0.00418 0.00569 
 People (0.000810) (0.000408) (0.00470) (0.0163) 
Health Expenditures per Capita -3.57e-05 1.000 -0.000206 -8.76e-05 
 (5.45e-05) (8.34e-05) (0.000309) (0.00121) 
Number of Fatal Car Accidents  -0.000866 1.001 -0.00195 0.00969 
 per 1,000,000 People (0.000822) (0.00120) (0.00454) (0.0164) 
Constant 10.36*** – 7.267* 16.87 
 (0.753)  (3.939) (12.78) 
Observations 89,507 88,147 450 450 
R-squared 0.398 – 0.811 0.837 
Akaike’s Information Criterion – 1852511 – – 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. State-level controls 
come from the U.S. Census Bureau (demographics), Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate), 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (income), American Bar Association (number of lawyers), Area Health 
Resources Files (number of physicians), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National Health 
Expenditure Data (health expenditures), and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (number of fatal car accidents). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Claim 
Duration Hazard Rate with Adjusted Zero Values 
 Zero defined as 
0.01923 
Zero defined as 
0.33 
Zero defined as 
0.67 
Zero defined as 
1.0 
Prohibition 3.464*** 3.464*** 3.464*** 3.420*** 
 (0.569) (0.569) (0.569) (0.549) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.943 0.943 0.943 0.943 
 (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0432) (0.0432) 
Disclosure Law 1.059 1.059 1.059 1.059 
 (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0428) (0.0427) 
Acknowledgment  0.849*** 0.849*** 0.849*** 0.850*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) 
     
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Other Laws X X X X 
Individual-Level Controls X X X X 
State-Level Controls X X X X 
     
Observations 89,507 89,507 89,507 89,507 
Akaike’s Information Criterion 1882845 1882845 1882845 1883141 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. The numbers 
reported are hazard ratios from Cox regressions. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The Akaike’s 
Information Criterion provides a measure of fit; a smaller number indicates a smaller deviance from the 
empirical model. Other laws include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort reforms, and effective 
payday loan bans. Individual-level controls include patient gender, patient age, injury severity, practitioner 
age, practitioner graduation cohort, type of malpractice allegation, practitioner field of license, whether 
there was a judgment, and whether there was a state fund payment. State-level demographics from the U.S. 
Census Bureau include the shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 years old, with at least a 
bachelor’s degree, and live in a metropolitan area. Other state-level controls include unemployment rate 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics), income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), number of lawyers per 
100,000 people (American Bar Association), number of physicians per 100,000 people (Area Health 
Resources Files), health expenditures per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ National 
Health Expenditure Data), and number of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people (National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3. The Effects of State-Level Characteristics on Existence of State Actions 
 State Action Indicator State Action Tiers 
Percent Female 10.27 25.24 
 (11.35) (33.19) 
Percent Hispanic -2.942 -3.355 
      (6.240) (21.47) 
Percent Black -6.429 -20.18 
 (11.14) (27.00) 
Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 3.264 7.723 
 (3.709) (11.34) 
Percent 65 Years or Older -3.428 -12.10 
 (6.323) (17.38) 
Percent with At Least a College Degree 1.232 1.168 
 (1.846) (5.658) 
Income per Capita 4.07e-06 5.01e-06 
 (1.10e-05) (3.23e-05) 
Unemployment Rate -0.00333 -0.0361 
 (0.0229) (0.0732) 
Home Price Index -0.00125 -0.00269 
 (0.00114) (0.00260) 
Financial Institutions Industry Contributions(t–2) -7.04e-09 -8.27e-09 
 (9.80e-09) (3.43e-08) 
Health Industry Contributions(t–2) 5.42e-09 1.05e-08 
 (5.16e-09) (1.52e-08) 
Insurance Industry Contributions(t–2) -6.12e-10 -1.39e-08 
 (6.61e-09) (1.54e-08) 
Lawyers and Lobbyists Contributions(t–2) -4.54e-10 4.47e-09 
 (2.78e-09) (6.86e-09) 
State Governor Democrat 0.0455 0.123 
 (0.0319) (0.0876) 
State Legislature Democrat -0.0384 -0.0793 
 (0.0414) (0.112) 
Constant -4.848 -11.03 
 (5.678) (16.62) 
   
Observations 650 650 
R-squared 0.619 0.683 
Note: Data at state-year level are from years 2000–2012. State-level characteristics are from the U.S. 
Census Bureau (demographics), Bureau of Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (unemployment rate), and Federal Housing Finance Agency (home price index). Political 
contributions data come from the National Institute on Money in State Politics, and political affiliation data 
come from Carl Klarner’s open access databases and the National Conference of State Legislatures partisan 
composition tables. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. All regressions include 
state and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A4. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions with Post-2007 
Indicator 
 Log(Claim 
Payment) 
Claim Duration 
Hazard Rate 
Filing Rate 
(Population) 
Filing Rate 
(Physician) 
Prohibition -0.194*** 3.382*** -1.194* -3.584* 
 (0.0409) (0.550) (0.690) (1.799) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 0.0387 0.942 -0.180 -0.0429 
 (0.0590) (0.0438) (0.347) (1.305) 
Disclosure Law -0.0281 1.051 -0.520 -0.999 
 (0.0271) (0.0425) (0.591) (1.462) 
Acknowledgment -0.00602 0.853*** 0.338** 1.624** 
 (0.0306) (0.0337) (0.150) (0.694) 
Post-2007 Indicator 0.122 2.201*** 0.313 -7.466** 
 (0.134) (0.431) (0.819) (3.249) 
     
State and Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Other Laws X X X X 
Individual-Level Controls X X   
State-Level Controls X X X X 
     
Observations 89,507 88,147 450 450 
R-squared 0.398 – 0.811 0.837 
Akaike’s Information Criterion – 1852511 – – 
Note: Author’s calculations are from the National Practitioner Data Bank Public Access File (claims 
initiated after 2003 and resolved by June 2016) in conjunction with other sources cited below. Clustered 
standard errors are in parentheses. Other laws include champerty and maintenance prohibitions, tort 
reforms, and effective payday loan bans. Individual-level controls include patient gender, patient age, 
injury severity, practitioner age, practitioner graduation cohort, type of malpractice allegation, practitioner 
field of license, whether there was a judgment, and whether there was a state fund payment. State-level 
demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau include the shares of the population that are nonwhite, over 65 
years old, with at least a bachelor’s degree, and live in a metropolitan area. Other state-level controls 
include unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics), income per capita (Bureau of Economic Analysis), 
number of lawyers per 100,000 people (American Bar Association), number of physicians per 100,000 
people (Area Health Resources Files), health expenditures per capita (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ National Health Expenditure Data), and number of fatal car accidents per 1,000,000 people 
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System). *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER II. THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING ON 
BANKRUPTCY 
 
1. Introduction 
 Consumer litigation funding (“funding”)—a controversial credit source that helps 
households deal with financial shocks—has become increasingly popular over the last 
two decades. It is available to those who suffer an injury that can serve as the basis of a 
legal claim. A tort plaintiff can apply for a cash advance in exchange for repayment of 
that advance, interest, and fees out of the lawsuit proceeds. The financier is paid out of 
the case proceeds that remain after the attorney and other higher-priority creditors are 
compensated. If the remaining case proceeds are less than the total amount owed to the 
financier, the plaintiff is required to pay the financier only the remaining case proceeds. 
Funding is functionally a nonrecourse loan that uses the lawsuit as collateral.23 As of 
2016, seventeen states have already taken some form of state action concerning this 
growing financial product, while at least six other states are considering bills to regulate 
this practice.  
 In the name of protecting borrowers, several consumer advocacy organizations 
have argued for strict limitations on funding by comparing it to payday lending (Skiba 
and Xiao, forthcoming). A payday loan is a cash advance that is less than $1,000 with a 
cost of 10 to 20 percent interest during the loan term, which is typically one to two 
weeks. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 80 percent of payday 
loans are renewed within two weeks; 50 percent of all payday loans are part of a renewal 
                                                
23 Whether funding is considered a “loan” for legal purposes depends on the state. Currently, funding is 
treated as a loan under the state consumer credit code in Michigan, North Carolina, Kansas, Maryland, 
Colorado, and South Carolina. In Texas, funding is considered an investment, not a loan.  
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chain of at least ten loans (Burke et al. 2014, p. 4). Critics of payday lending view 
borrower behavior related to renewals as evidence of a “debt trap”; that is, borrowers 
obtain, for example, a $500 loan, expecting to pay only $75 in interest, but instead pay 
many times that amount in interest due to the renewals (Morgan and Strain 2008, p. 9). 
One consumer advocacy organization has estimated that approximately five million 
payday loan customers fall into debt traps and are unable to pay off what they owe 
(Ernst et al. 2004, p. 2). Because of this, payday lending has a bad reputation among 
consumer advocates and policymakers (Skiba 2012, p. 1025). Unlike payday borrowing, 
obtaining a funding advance for litigation cannot result in a debt trap because the advance 
is nonrecourse and capped at the case proceeds. Although no empirical evidence exists to 
address the impact of funding on consumer financial outcomes, some states have been 
swayed by consumer advocates’ analogies of funding to payday lending and severely 
restricted the funding industry. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
same caps on interest and fees that govern payday loans also cover funding advances.  
This paper examines the effect of access to funding on consumer welfare, 
measured by the Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy rates. County-level Chapter 7 and 13 filing 
data come from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records for 1998–2012 and the 
U.S. Courts Statistics and Reports for 2013–2015. I employ a difference-in-differences 
identification strategy, using state actions that affect funding, in order to evaluate the 
impact of the availability of funding on bankruptcy. In 2003, the Ohio Supreme Court 
expressly banned nonrecourse loans; this ban was lifted by the legislature in 2008. I find 
that this ban increased Chapter 7 filings by 5.3 per 10,000 people (or 20 percent relative 
to the mean) and Chapter 13 filings by 1.7 per 10,000 people (or 15 percent relative to the 
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mean). In Florida and Texas, a state court has held that neither the doctrines against 
champerty and maintenance nor usury laws restrict nonrecourse loans (an action that I 
call an “acknowledgment of funding”). Judicial acknowledgment of funding, which is 
analogous to legislature legalization of a credit product, decreased Chapter 13 filings by 
2.6 per 10,000 people (or 23 percent relative to the mean). These results provide some 
evidence that funding may help plaintiffs absorb the financial consequences of adverse 
events. Funding may also prevent plaintiffs from accruing fees from more expensive 
credit products such as payday loans or credit card loans. By doing so, funding reduces 
bankruptcies. As Chapter 13 has a worse record of actual debt discharge and higher filing 
costs than Chapter 7 (Porter 2011, p. 107–13), access to funding may improve consumer 
welfare since it reduces the Chapter 13 filing rate.  
This paper fits into the emerging literature on legal finance and is the first study to 
explore the effect of this type of credit on consumer financial outcomes. Previous works 
have focused on the effect of legal finance on litigation, as opposed to consumer welfare 
(see Abrams and Chen 2013; Daughety and Reinganum 2014; Avraham and 
Wickelgren 2014; Chen 2015; Deffains and Desrieux 2015; Xiao 2017). This paper also 
expands the literature on alternative financial products. Previous studies have addressed 
borrower behavior and outcomes associated with payday loans (Zinman 2010; 
Melzer 2011; Morse 2011; Hynes 2012; Morgan et al. 2012; Campbell et al. 2012; 
Bhutta 2014; Bhutta et al. 2015; Skiba and Tobacman 2015; Carter 2015; Carter and 
Skimmyhorn, forthcoming), car-title loans (Fritzdixon et al. 2014; Fritzdixon 2015), and 
pawnshops (Bos et al. 2012; Carter and Skiba 2012).  
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Finally, this work contributes to the literature on how credit supply affects 
personal bankruptcy. Morgan et al. (2012) and Skiba and Tobacman (2015) both 
provided evidence that payday loans increase Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Dick and 
Lehnert (2010) found that deregulation of traditional banks increases the Chapter 7 filing 
rate by enabling previously excluded high-risk individuals to obtain credit card loans. As 
with an increase in payday lending, an increase in borrowing on credit cards results in 
more finance charges and can put pressure on consumers to file for bankruptcy. In 
contrast, repayment of a funding advance is capped at the lawsuit proceeds. A funded 
plaintiff cannot roll over his nonrecourse loan or receive another advance on the same 
case. Further, repayment occurs at the end of the lawsuit and comes from an income-
producing asset. Thus, plaintiffs need not continuously pay finance charges, nor do they 
need to rely on their own (lack of) self-control to decide when to repay the loan, as 
payday and credit card consumers do (cf. Skiba and Tobacman 2008).  
Section 2 provides background information on consumer litigation funding. 
Section 3 gives an overview of bankruptcy. Section 4 presents the conceptual framework 
of how funding can impact bankruptcy. Section 5 describes the data and empirical 
specifications. Section 6 reports the results, and Section 7 discusses them. Section 8 
concludes. 
2. Background on Consumer Litigation Funding and Related Laws 
In his application for a nonrecourse advance, the plaintiff must disclose to the 
financier basic case information, including the extent and type of harm and any lawsuit 
liens, so that the financier can calculate the expected profitability of the case. If the 
funder approves the plaintiff’s application, then it advances 10 to 20 percent of the 
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expected lawsuit proceeds (Appelbaum 2011a; Garber 2010, p. 12). Commentators have 
reported cash advances ranging from $500 to $100,000 (Carter 2004; Garber 2010, p. 12) 
and interest rates ranging from 2 to 15 percent per month, with annual percentage rates 
(“APRs”) commonly over 150 percent (Carter 2004; Griffis 2011; Appelbaum 2011a). 
Financiers fund all types of torts including car accident claims, medical malpractice 
lawsuits, and product liability cases. 
Plaintiffs typically use their advances for living expenses, such as utilities, car 
payments, rent, food, and medical bills (Rodak 2006, p. 514; Garber 2010, p. 12; 
Estevao 2013, p. 476; Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). Generally, these plaintiffs have 
already entered into contingency fee contracts with lawyers who have agreed to represent 
the plaintiffs in exchange for a portion (on average, a third) of the lawsuit proceeds 
(Garber 2010, p. 9; Kritzer 2004, p. 39). Thus, consumer legal funding is not spent on 
litigation costs. 
There are two primary reasons why this financial service prompts consumer 
protection advocates to call for strict limitations. First, although no formal data are 
available on the average income of funded plaintiffs, the fact that a majority of these 
plaintiffs spend their cash advances on living necessities has led several commentators to 
surmise that nonrecourse loans cater to the liquidity-constrained, low-income population 
(Rodak 2006, p. 514; Martin 2008, p. 84–85; Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). Second, 
some express concerns that high funding rates “further victimize[]” plaintiffs who have 
already suffered physical and/or emotional injuries (Rodak 2006, p. 518; 
McLaughlin 2007, p. 656). Because opponents of funding view this credit product’s 
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customers as vulnerable, they advocate for either outright bans or extremely low interest 
rate and fee caps (McLaughlin 2007, p. 656–59). 
Table 1 presents all of the state actions that affect access to, and demand for, 
funding during the time period empirically examined in this paper (1998–2015). It also 
provides these actions’ citations and the expected directions of these actions’ effects on 
the number of nonrecourse loans. Only one express ban impacts this time period.24 In 
2003, the Ohio Supreme Court condemned funding contracts by using doctrines against 
champerty and maintenance. Though the elements and application of these doctrines vary 
by state, maintenance is generally when a third party with no direct interest in the case 
assists a litigant in bringing the lawsuit, and champerty is a type of maintenance in which 
the third party pursues profit from case proceeds. Next, a state—through a judicial 
decision or agency ruling—can subject nonrecourse loans to interest or fee caps in the 
state usury law. All of the caps listed in Table 1 restrict the interest rate to 36 percent or 
less per year. Since funding APRs are typically over 100 percent, these caps should be 
binding on high-cost financiers and should thus reduce the supply of nonrecourse loans.25  
While consumer advocacy organizations have pushed for strict measures, the 
industry itself has lobbied for funding statutes with only disclosure provisions, a less 
restrictive alternative to bans or caps on interest and fees (Appelbaum 2011a, 2011b). 
These provisions mandate the communication of finance charges and APRs. During this 
                                                
24 Vermont implemented a temporary ban via statute from July 1, 2015, to July 1, 2016 (Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 8, § 2246). However, I do not incorporate the Vermont ban into my analysis because I code state actions 
to take effect the year after the actions occurred. 
25 While South Carolina limits the interest for principal up to $600 to 25 percent per year with a maximum 
initial fee of 7 percent of the funding (S.C. Code Ann. § 34-29-140), it leaves interest for principal over 
$600 uncapped (S.C. Code Ann. § 37-3-201). Since the average funding amount runs between $1,750 and 
$4,500 (Garber 2010, p. 12), South Carolina’s law arguably does not impact the industry much. The results 
of regressions leaving South Carolina out of the category of interest and fee caps are very similar to those 
with South Carolina. Thus, I leave this state in this category for the regressions reported in this paper.  
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time period, five legislatures passed statutes with disclosure provisions: Maine, Nebraska, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.26 Additionally, as a result of potentially questionable 
practices that some were accusing financiers of in the early 2000s (Nieuwveld and 
Shannon 2012, p. 122; Martin 2004, p. 70), the New York Attorney General conducted 
an investigation and entered into an agreement with nine financiers in 2005. This 
agreement contains disclosure provisions similar to those in the funding statutes. In order 
to become a member of the American Legal Finance Association (a trade association for 
funders), a financier must abide by the New York agreement (ALFA 2016). 
Theoretically, disclosure laws necessitate financier compliance expenditures and may 
lead some consumers to decide that the costs of an advance outweigh the benefits. While 
these laws hypothetically can decrease legal finance through reducing demand, borrower 
behavior in fact may not change much. Many consumers are financially desperate 
(Garber 2010, p. 10, 12; Martin 2008, p. 84–85; Beydler 2012, p. 1166) and may not 
forgo funding even with disclosures.  
Finally, in states without a funding statute in place, a financier may win a case in 
state court that strikes down the two biggest legal challenges to nonrecourse loans: 
(1) funding should be subject to the interest or fee caps in state usury laws and 
(2) funding should be prohibited because it violates the state doctrines against champerty 
and maintenance. Such an action by a state court, which I call an “acknowledgment of 
funding,” should reduce the industry’s litigation costs and should thus increase the supply 
of nonrecourse loans. The impact of a judicial acknowledgment should be similar to the 
effect of legislature legalization of a credit product. 
                                                
26 The Tennessee statute also includes a cap on interest and fees, but the cap went into effect a year after the 
disclosure provisions went into effect. Thus, I do not empirically examine the Tennessee cap on interest 
and fees in this paper.  
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3. Overview of Bankruptcy 
 A large literature exists on Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy (see, e.g., Fay et al. 2002 
and Dobbie and Song 2015). Under Chapter 7, all unsecured debts, including credit card 
bills and medical expenses, are dischargeable. A Chapter 7 filer must give the bankruptcy 
trustee all of his assets that are not exempted by law, and the trustee uses these assets to 
repay the filer’s creditors. In contrast, a Chapter 13 filer is not required to turn over any 
assets but instead has to construct a plan to repay a percentage of his debts from future 
income. A bankruptcy judge must approve the filer’s plan.  
State exemption laws define the levels of assets that are protected from seizure by 
creditors during bankruptcy. Federal exemption laws also exist, and eighteen states allow 
debtors to choose between state and federal exemptions. Real property is an important 
asset that is protected by homestead exemptions. Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Texas do not cap the homestead exemption amount, and twenty-nine states 
have homestead exemptions over $50,000. The federal homestead exemption level is 
currently $23,675.  
Wage garnishment laws define the amount of income that is protected from 
creditors. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act shields 75 percent of wages or 
thirty times the federal minimum wage per week from garnishment—whichever amount 
is greater—and protects employees from being fired due to garnishment. The Act also 
allows states to enact their own laws to specify an amount higher than the federal limit; 
twenty-six states have done this. 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”) changed bankruptcy in three major ways (White 2007; White 2009). First, 
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the Act made it more difficult for debtors to file under Chapter 7 by requiring that debtors 
pass a “means test.” Debtors’ monthly household income, averaged over the six months 
prior to filing, must be lower than the median monthly household income in their state, 
adjusted for household size. Second, BAPCPA took away the freedom of debtors to 
propose their own Chapter 13 repayment plans. Debtors now must follow a strict 
procedure to determine their allowances for housing, utilities, transportation, food, 
clothing, and personal care. Finally, the Act raised the cost of filing for households by 
requiring higher court fees, submission of past tax returns, enrollment in a credit-
counseling course before filing, and enrollment in a debt management course prior to 
debt discharge. Further, BAPCPA subjected attorneys to new registration requirements, 
certification of the accuracy of filers’ information on bankruptcy forms, and liability for 
filers’ false and misleading information. This led lawyers to increase their fees, making 
bankruptcy even more expensive for debtors. 
Empirical research demonstrates that many different factors influence the 
bankruptcy filing decision and account for filing rate variations across states and time. 
These factors include the ability to pay for court and attorney fees (Mann and 
Porter 2010; Gross et al. 2014), high levels of medical and credit card debt (Domowitz 
and Sartain 1999; Zhu 2011; Himmelstein et al. 2005, 2009), divorce (Fay et al. 2002; 
Edmiston 2006), gambling (Barron et al. 2002; Edmiston 2006), social stigma or 
information costs of filing (Gross and Souleles 2002), access to credit (Dick and 
Lehnert 2010; Morgan et al. 2012; Hynes 2012; Skiba and Tobacman 2015; 
Fritzdixon 2015), state exemption laws and wage garnishment laws (Lefgren and 
McIntyre 2009; Miller 2012), public safety nets (Lefgren and McIntyre 2009), race 
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(Braucher et al. 2012), and local legal culture (Lefgren and McIntyre 2009; 
Lefgren et al. 2010). 
4. Conceptual Framework: How Funding Affects Bankruptcy 
Access to consumer litigation funding can theoretically increase or decrease the 
bankruptcy rate.27 On one hand, funding is a source of credit for cash-constrained 
plaintiffs and may enable them to smooth their consumption, thus reducing the 
bankruptcy rate (see similar consumption smoothing argument for payday lending in 
Skiba 2012, p. 1026, and Dobridge 2016, p. 1). Specifically, funding can thwart 
bankruptcy for plaintiffs for whom an adverse event or debt from more expensive types 
of credit (or both an adverse event and debt) would have caused bankruptcy. 
First, nonrecourse loans can help plaintiffs for whom an adverse event is a 
precipitating cause of bankruptcy. Some studies provide empirical evidence that an 
adverse event, such as an illness, injury, job loss, or divorce, may lead to an unexpected 
increase in expenditures and/or a decrease in income, which eventually culminates in 
bankruptcy (Fay et al. 2002; Edmiston 2006; Himmelstein et al. 2005, 2009).28 Many 
who experience adverse events may be eligible for nonrecourse advances because these 
events frequently implicate legal claims. For example, automobile accidents often involve 
lawsuits against insurance companies (IRC 2014). In fact, most of the underlying cases in 
                                                
27 As of 2016, the only bankruptcy litigation funding that exists is the financing of litigation trusts related to 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies (Corrigan 2015; Cumings 2015). These funders do not structure transactions as 
nonrecourse loans; thus, the state actions discussed in Section 2 do not apply. Currently, funders do not 
supply capital to individual debtors specifically for the purpose of filing Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies. 
28 Scholars debate whether the incidence of adverse events or strategic filing is the primary cause of 
bankruptcy. Some view filing as mainly a strategic choice (White 1998; Fay et al. 2002; 
Hankins et al. 2011; Zhu 2011; Morrison et al. 2013). Accordingly, the availability of bankruptcy may 
influence consumption patterns and raise filing rates. This paper’s research question and results do not 
depend on adverse events being the primary cause of bankruptcy. Instead, this paper asks and provides 
evidence on whether access to a new form of credit can help improve outcomes for individuals who suffer 
adverse events (either randomly or as a result of individual characteristics that also make them prone to 
bankruptcy). 
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funding are related to car accidents (Garber 2010, p. 10). An accident could cause a 
plaintiff to become unemployed and accumulate substantial medical bills. 
Sullivan et al. (1989, p. 167) gave a detailed description of a bankruptcy filer for whom a 
car accident was the “precipitating event for disastrous medical bills and [] eventual 
bankruptcy.” Assuming that customers are rational and have the right information, 
funding advances can help plaintiffs wait for their settlements or trial awards without 
having to file for bankruptcy. 
Nonrecourse loans can also help plaintiffs for whom debt from more expensive 
credit products is a precipitating cause of bankruptcy. The adverse event that these 
plaintiffs experience can be—but does not have to be—a concurrent cause of bankruptcy. 
Morgan et al. (2012) and Skiba and Tobacman (2015) found that payday loans cause 
more Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Skiba and Tobacman (2015) surmised that payday loan 
finance charges raise the debt-related household cash flow burden and thus tip consumers 
into bankruptcy. Dick and Lehnert (2010) found that removal of entry restrictions on out-
of-state banks (“deregulation”) increases Chapter 7 bankruptcies, likely due to a rise in 
the credit card loan rate. Like payday loans, credit card loans have high fees that accrue 
quickly over time and may put pressure on consumers to file for bankruptcy. By choosing 
funding, some plaintiffs may not need to obtain more expensive types of credit, such as 
payday or credit card loans, and may therefore avert bankruptcy.  
There are four attributes of funding that make it a potentially less costly 
alternative to other financial products. First, although funding interest rates are high, the 
total payment is capped at the lawsuit proceeds. The plaintiff is not responsible for 
repaying fees that exceed the earnings from the case. Second, a plaintiff cannot obtain 
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more than one nonrecourse loan per lawsuit. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot accumulate 
debt from multiple nonrecourse loans. Third, repayment occurs only once at the end of 
the case. Thus, no recurring payments can tip consumers into bankruptcy. Finally, 
repayment comes from an income-producing asset and does not rely on the level of the 
plaintiff’s self-control.  
In sum, funding can prevent bankruptcy by helping plaintiffs smooth their 
consumption. In particular, this credit source can aid those for whom an adverse event 
would have caused bankruptcy and those for whom the fees of more expensive types of 
loans would have caused bankruptcy.  
On the other hand, access to funding can raise the bankruptcy rate in two ways. 
First, debtors may use their nonrecourse advances to pay for the filing costs of 
bankruptcy (Mann and Porter 2010; Gross et al. 2014). Second, consumers may be 
systematically susceptible to cognitive biases and errors in their cost-benefit analysis of 
obtaining these advances (see surveys Rabin 1998 and DellaVigna 2009). Skiba and 
Xiao (forthcoming) explained that salience effects, differential mental accounting, and 
the lack of the pain of payment may obscure this financial product’s impact on consumer 
cash flow. Because repayment comes from lawsuit proceeds, the effect of funding on 
earnings is not salient, and borrowers may underestimate the costs of legal finance (see 
Chetty et al. 2009). Due to differential mental accounting, consumers may be more 
willing to spend money from case proceeds than ordinary earned income to pay for 
funding fees (see Thaler 1999). Since attorneys disburse the amount owed to financiers, 
customers do not experience the pain of payment associated with nonrecourse advances 
(see Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Additionally, funding’s tie to litigation may 
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complicate consumer repayment calculus (Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). Customers may 
underestimate case duration and, in turn, the fees due at the end of the lawsuit. In sum, 
borrowers may make mistakes in obtaining these advances and end up in higher levels of 
debt with funding than without. Thus, legal finance may increase the bankruptcy rate.  
As discussed in Section 2, state actions should impact the number of nonrecourse 
advances. As explained in this Section, these advances should decrease or increase 
bankruptcy. Table 2 summarizes how the state actions should affect the number of 
nonrecourse loans and, in turn, bankruptcy rates.   
5. Data and Empirical Specification 
     5.1. Data 
 The dependent variables are the Chapter 7, Chapter 13, and joint Chapter 7 and 13 
filing rates. Table 3 reports the means of these variables. Data on the annual number of 
nonbusiness (individual) Chapter 7 and 13 filings by county come from the Public Access 
to Court Electronic Records for years 1998–2012 and from the U.S. Courts Statistics and 
Reports for years 2013–2015. Population data come from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (“BEA”). From these datasets, I construct three variables by county and year: 
the number of Chapter 7 filings per 10,000 people, the number of Chapter 13 filings 
per 10,000 people, and the combined number of Chapter 7 and 13 filings per 10,000 
people.  
The independent variables of interest are the state actions that affect funding. I 
form variables that correspond to the four state action categories shown in Table 1: 
prohibition, interest rate or fee cap, disclosure law, and acknowledgment. The variables 
equal one for the states affected, starting the year after the actions occurred.  
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In order to control for the effect of other laws that may impact bankruptcy, I 
create variables for effective payday loan bans, state homestead exemptions, availability 
of federal exemptions, wage garnishment laws, BAPCPA, and prohibitions against 
champerty and maintenance. I construct a variable that is equal to one if a state has 
expressly prohibited payday loans or has enacted interest or fee caps that make it 
unprofitable for lenders to offer these loans (“effective payday loan bans”). I gather the 
information needed to construct such a variable from Bhutta (2014), 
Morgan et al. (2012), the Consumer Federation of America’s website (CFA 2016), and 
Westlaw. Next, I form an indicator that is equal to one if the state homestead exemption 
is above $50,000 and another indicator that is equal to one if the state allows the filer to 
use federal exemptions. I also construct an indicator that is equal to one if the wage 
garnishment level is set at the federal limit. Information on bankruptcy exemptions and 
wage garnishment laws comes from Miller (2012), Carter (2012), Pettit and Platte (2011), 
and Westlaw. With a post-2005 indicator variable, I account for the effect of BAPCPA. 
Finally, as mentioned before, a court can utilize the doctrines against champerty and 
maintenance to ban funding. In order to verify that the effects of funding state actions are 
not the result of any indirect impact that these doctrines may have on bankruptcy through 
a non-funding mechanism, I create an indicator that equals one for any state that has a 
champerty or maintenance law in place. I obtain the information needed to construct this 
variable from Bond (2012) and Westlaw. 
In order to control for household debt and asset levels, filing fees, and other 
unobservable characteristics, I form several variables related to demographics and 
economic conditions. Table 3 provides the means of these variables. The demographics 
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from the U.S. Census Bureau are the annual shares of the population that are female, 
Hispanic, black, Asian or Pacific Islander, 65 years or older, and with at least a college 
degree. The variables that account for annual economic conditions are income per capita 
from the BEA, unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and home price 
index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. All of these variables, except for the 
share of the population with at least a college degree and the home price index, are 
matched to the Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates by county and year; the two exceptions are 
matched by state and year.  
     5.2 Empirical Specification 
This paper employs a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the effect of 
consumer litigation funding on bankruptcy rates. I run ordinary least squares regressions 
of the form: 
Bankruptcy Ratecst = α + β1Prohibitionst + β2Interest or Fee Capst + β3Disclosure 
Lawst + β4Acknowledgmentst + ΣaτaOther Lawsst + ΣhγhDemographicscst + 
ΣjλjEconomic Conditionscst + ΣtδtYeart + ΣsµsStates + εcst, 
in which bankruptcy rate can be the Chapter 7, Chapter 13, or joint Chapter 7 and 13 
filing rate for county c, state s, and year t. Other laws include champerty and maintenance 
prohibitions, effective payday loan bans, state homestead exemptions, allowance of 
federal exemptions, wage garnishment limits, and BAPCPA. Demographics include 
percent female, percent Hispanic, percent black, percent Asian or Pacific Islander, 
percent 65 years or older, and percent with at least a college degree. Economic conditions 
consist of the income per capita, unemployment rate, and home price index. The 
regressions incorporate year fixed effects to account for time trends and state fixed 
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effects to control for time-constant characteristics of the states. I cluster standard errors 
by state in order to avoid difference-in-differences estimation problems related to serial 
correlation (Bertrand et al. 2004).    
I am interested in the effects of the state actions that are captured by the beta (βi) 
coefficients. In Table 2, the predicted directions of the effects on bankruptcy rates are the 
expected signs of the beta coefficients. Prohibition, cap on the interest rate or fees, and 
disclosure law decrease the number of nonrecourse advances while acknowledgment 
increases the number of these advances. If the consumption smoothing effect dominates, 
a reduction in funding should lead to a rise in the bankruptcy rate. Thus, β1, β2, and β3 
should be positive, and β4 should be negative. If the filing cost effect and/or the cognitive 
biases-and-errors effect dominates, a decrease in funding should result in a decline in the 
bankruptcy rate. Therefore, the predicted signs of the coefficients should be the opposite 
of those under the consumption smoothing effect.  
6. Results  
     6.1 Main Regressions 
Table 4 reports the effects of the state actions in regressions in which the 
dependent variables are the Chapter 7, Chapter 13, and joint Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates. 
All regressions account for other laws, demographics, and economic conditions. 
Columns (1) to (4) also include state and year controls. The results for columns (2) to (4) 
are similar to the results of the basic specification regressions in column (1). Column (2) 
shows the outputs for models estimated with population weights, and column (3) presents 
the findings for models estimated with lagged demographics and economic conditions. 
Column (4) reports the outputs for regressions estimated with a post-2007 indicator to 
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control for the effect of the Great Recession on legal finance.29 The Great Recession 
prompted investors to shift capital to litigation funding because lawsuit outcomes are not 
correlated with market outcomes (Steinitz 2011, p. 1283–84).  
 In Table 4, column (5), I follow Hynes (2012) and analyze the data using a fixed-
effects empirical strategy available for panel data. Hynes (2012) used this methodology 
to examine the effect of payday loan legalization. In the fixed-effects regressions, I 
difference out unobservable, time-invariant factors, such as local legal culture, at the 
county level. Because the literature notes the large influence that local legal culture can 
have on bankruptcy (Lefgren and McIntyre 2009; Lefgren et al. 2010; Braucher 1993), 
the fixed-effects results in column (5) likely provide the most reliable findings. I report 
the results of fixed-effects regressions with lagged controls.30 The Ohio prohibition 
increased Chapter 7 filings by 5.3 per 10,000 people and Chapter 13 filings by 1.7 per 
10,000 people. Acknowledgment, which occurred in Florida and Texas, decreased 
Chapter 13 filings by 2.6 per 10,000 people. In contrast to the findings in columns (1) 
to (4), the coefficient on acknowledgment in the Chapter 7 filing rate regression in 
column (5) is no longer significant. This suggests that this effect was the result of time-
invariant omitted factors, such as local legal culture. With regard to the joint Chapter 7 
and 13 filing rate, the Ohio prohibition is the only state action that has an effect, though 
all the state actions are jointly significant at the one percent level. The prohibition raised 
Chapter 7 and 13 filings by 7.0 per 10,000 people.  
                                                
29 NBER dates the start of the Great Recession as December 2007 (NBER 2010). 
30 Table A1 presents the full results of the fixed-effects, lagged-controls specification. 
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Table 5 reports the state action estimates of three robustness checks.31 First, I 
examine whether incorporating Chapter 11 bankruptcies affects the results. Only a few 
thousand people per year in the United States file for nonbusiness Chapter 11 
bankruptcies; those who file are usually wealthier with monthly incomes in the 
top 40 percent of household incomes nationally (Hynes et al., forthcoming). Since 
nonrecourse loans primarily serve the low-income population, funding state actions 
should primarily affect nonbusiness Chapter 7 and 13 filings. Column (1) reports the 
results for the regression in which the dependent variable is all nonbusiness filings per 
10,000 people, including Chapter 11 filings. The Ohio prohibition has the same effect as 
in the basic specification in which the dependent variable is only nonbusiness Chapter 7 
and 13 filings per 10,000 people (see Table 4, column (1)). Incorporating individual 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies makes no difference to the results, indicating that nonbusiness 
Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies drive the findings.  
Second, I conduct a falsification test to examine whether the state actions affect 
nonbusiness Chapter 11 bankruptcies. In Table 5, column (2) reports the estimates for the 
regression in which the dependent variable is only the nonbusiness Chapter 11 filings per 
10,000 people. All of the state actions have insignificant effects. This is consistent with 
funding primarily affecting individuals who would file for Chapter 7 or 13. Finally, I 
conduct another falsification test to examine whether the state actions affect business 
bankruptcies. Consumer litigation funders do not advance cash to business entities; they 
focus on individuals with legal claims. Thus, the state actions should not impact the 
business filing rate. Table 5, column (3), confirms this. The estimates in columns (2) 
                                                
31 All results in Table 5 come from ordinary least squares regressions. Fixed-effects regressions yield very 
similar results. 
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and (3) are insignificant, close to zero, and precise. Thus, the results of the falsification 
checks provide evidence that access to funding affects nonbusiness Chapter 7 and 13 
filings. 
Finally, because the number of state actions in each category is very small (see 
Conley and Taber 2011), I estimate all regressions in Table 4 with bootstrap standard 
errors.32 The significant effects in Table 4 remain significant in the regressions with 
bootstrap standard errors.33  
     6.2 Endogeneity  
Although I am able to address time-invariant factors that may cause endogeneity 
by employing fixed-effects panel data analysis (see Table 4, column (5)), 34  I am 
unsuccessful in my efforts to account for time-varying factors related to funding that 
might cause endogeneity. I attempt to instrument for funding state actions with political 
contributions of different industries that may be influenced by these nonrecourse 
advances and political affiliations of the state legislature and governor, but statistical tests 
indicate that these instruments are extremely weak. This means that the two-stage least 
squares regressions with these instruments are unreliable. Therefore, I do not report them.   
Endogeneity caused by time-varying factors related to funding is likely not 
significant in this study for four reasons. First, research has produced no evidence that 
bankruptcy was a consideration in the implementation of the state actions. Second, during 
                                                
32 Bootstrapping is a nonparametric method of estimating the distribution of a parameter through random 
resampling. A bootstrap sample is created when one draws with replacement N observations from the N-
observation dataset. The formula for computing a bootstrap standard error is 
seˆ = {(1/ (k −1)) (θˆi −θ )2}1/2∑ , where θˆi  is the parameter calculated using the i-th bootstrap sample, θ  is 
the average of the bootstrap calculations, and k is the number of replications. 
33 Bootstrap results are available upon request. 
34 Fixed-effects panel data analysis essentially differences out any time-invariant unobservable factors that 
may cause endogeneity. 
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1998–2015, most of the state actions came from courts or agencies, both of which are 
generally less prone than legislatures to the influence of interest groups (see 
Epstein 1990, p. 841; Fesler 1940, p. 942). Further, the Ohio Supreme Court’s ban of 
litigation funding was spontaneous and independent. Neither the parties nor amici had 
argued for nonrecourse advances to be expressly prohibited.  
Third, financiers generally do not offer these advances based on anticipated 
likelihood of bankruptcy. While some firms screen for whether a plaintiff is in 
bankruptcy at the application date, most do not look at predictors for future bankruptcy, 
such as the plaintiff’s income or credit score. If the plaintiff enters into bankruptcy prior 
to the completion of the personal injury lawsuit, then one of two things can occur. Some 
states (e.g., California) allow plaintiffs to exempt part of their personal injury case 
proceeds; financiers may receive repayment from the exempted amount. Another 
outcome may be that no case proceeds are exempted. In this situation, funders may be 
treated as unsecured creditors with the lowest priority. Firms generally consider this 
second outcome to be the same as the outcome in which the plaintiff fails to recover any 
settlement or trial award, and thus, financiers do not seek repayment from the plaintiff’s 
assets in the bankruptcy proceeding.  
Fourth, ordinary least squares regressions examining the probability of a state 
action occurring provide evidence that state actions are not determined by time-variant 
demographic, economic, and political factors. For the dependent variables, I create an 
indicator that is equal to one if a state action impacts that time period; I also form a tiered 
variable that equals one if the prohibition is in effect, two if an interest or fee cap is in 
effect, three if a disclosure law is in effect, four if a judicial acknowledgment is in effect, 
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and zero if no state action is in effect. I regress the state action indicator and tiered 
variable on demographics, economic conditions, political contributions, and political 
affiliations. Table A2 shows that all of the independent variables have insignificant 
effects, which suggests that there is likely no bias due to these state characteristics.  
     6.3 Extension: Informal Bankruptcy 
An emerging concept in the bankruptcy literature is “informal bankruptcy,” which 
occurs when a consumer does not repay his debts for a long period of time and does not 
file for Chapter 7 or 13 (Agarwal et al. 2003; Dawsey and Ausubel 2004; 
Morgan et al. 2012). As the individual’s debts increase, he gets calls and notices from 
lenders and third-party debt collectors, which may use illegal tactics like harassment in 
order to collect the money owed (Sullivan et al. 1989, p. 21). As informal bankruptcy 
rises, complaints against lenders and third-party debt collectors to federal agencies 
increase. This is why complaint rates can serve as measures for the level of informal 
bankruptcy. Morgan et al. (2012) found that effective payday loan bans increase third-
party debt collector complaints to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) by 0.24 per 
100,000 people (or 17 percent relative to the mean). The FTC is responsible for enforcing 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1978. The goal of the Act is to curb abusive 
third-party debt collection practices. Accordingly, the FTC handles complaints from 
consumers regarding violations of this Act.  
In this Section, I examine the effect of funding state actions on informal 
bankruptcy. I measure informal bankruptcy by the number of complaints against third-
party debt collectors per 100,000 people (gathered by the FTC) and the number of 
complaints against credit card and mortgage lenders per 100,000 people (gathered by the 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)).35 The CFPB’s mission is to protect 
U.S. consumers in the financial marketplace. While the FTC addresses complaints against 
third-party debt collectors, the CFPB handles complaints against primary lenders 
regarding their financial services and products. The CFPB began with addressing credit 
card complaints and has expanded over the last few years to handling complaints 
concerning a wide range of financial products from payday loans to student loans.  
Through a Freedom of Information Act request to the FTC, I obtain annual data 
on complaints against third-party debt collectors by state for the years 2011–2015.36 
Using BEA population data, I create a variable equal to the number of FTC complaints 
per 100,000 people. The CFPB maintains a publicly accessible database of consumer 
complaints against lenders on its website. I obtain the 2012–2015 data for credit card and 
mortgage lenders, for which the longest period of information is available,37 and generate 
annual counts of complaints by state. Using BEA population data, I construct a variable 
equal to the number of CFPB credit card and mortgage complaints per 100,000 people. 
 Table A3 reports the effects of the state actions in regressions in which the 
dependent variables are the FTC and CFPB complaint rates. The Ohio prohibition does 
not affect the time period 2011–2015. All regressions account for other laws, 
demographics, and economic conditions. Columns (1) to (3) also include state and year 
controls. In column (4), I difference out time-invariant factors at the state level, not the 
county level, since county-level identifiers are not available in the complaint data. As the 
                                                
35 Funders typically have no need to outsource debt collection to third parties. Attorneys disburse the 
repayment to funders prior to plaintiffs receiving any money, and plaintiffs do not owe anything above the 
remaining lawsuit proceeds. 
36 Unfortunately, the FTC deletes data older than five years, so I could not obtain any data prior to 2011. 
37 The CFPB started handling credit card complaints on July 21, 2011, and added mortgage complaints at 
the end of 2011. 
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fixed-effects strategy depends on differences across time, acknowledgment drops out 
because the variable remains constant in 2011–2015. The only effects that are robust 
across columns (1) to (4) are the ones involving interest rate and fee caps on funding in 
the FTC and CFPB regressions. Unfortunately, the findings in the FTC regressions in 
Table A3 are not robust to bootstrap standard errors.38 Thus, the interest or fee cap effect 
in the CFPB regression is the only effect robust to all specifications. Column (4) reports 
that such a cap increases CFPB credit card and mortgage complaints by 1.2 per 100,000 
people (or 7.8 percent relative to the mean). This provides some evidence that an interest 
or fee cap on funding may take away nonrecourse loans as a credit option for some 
plaintiffs, causing them to resort to more expensive financial products, like credit card 
loans, in order to cover sizable expenses.  
7. Discussion 
This paper provides the first empirical evidence that access to funding may 
positively impact consumer welfare. In the fixed-effects regressions, the Ohio prohibition 
increased Chapter 7 filings by 5.3 per 10,000 people (or 20 percent relative to the mean) 
and Chapter 13 filings by 1.7 per 10,000 people (or 15 percent relative to the mean). A 
judicial acknowledgment, which occurred in Florida and Texas, reduced Chapter 13 
filings by 2.6 per 10,000 people (or 23 percent relative to the mean). When I examine the 
joint Chapter 7 and 13 filing rate, I find that the Ohio prohibition increased Chapter 7 
and 13 filings by 7.0 per 10,000 people (or 18 percent relative to the mean). As the joint 
filing rate accounts for substitution between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, this finding 
provides support that, overall, funding decreases the bankruptcy rate. These results are 
                                                
38 Bootstrap results are available upon request. 
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consistent with the hypothesis that nonrecourse advances help plaintiffs to absorb the 
financial shocks that come from adverse events or to avert more expensive forms of 
credit. In turn, these advances prevent bankruptcy. 
The welfare effects of bankruptcy are difficult to measure. Bankruptcy is the 
climax of a consumer’s financial distress, but it can also help the consumer get a “fresh 
start” (Chapter 7) or save his home (Chapter 13) (Livshits et al. 2007; White and 
Zhu 2010). Research shows that consumers benefit if they can get their debts discharged 
under Chapter 7 or 13. Parra (2016) found that debt relief under Chapter 7 increases the 
probability of the filer starting a business, obtaining secured lending, becoming a 
homeowner, and averting home foreclosure. Dobbie and Song (2015) demonstrated that 
Chapter 13 protection increases annual earnings, while reducing mortality and 
foreclosure rates. Also, Dobbie et al. (2015) found that Chapter 13 protection decreases 
adverse events including civil judgments and repossessions, raises the likelihood of being 
a homeowner, and improves credit scores.  
While Chapter 7 results in debt discharge over 95 percent of the time, Chapter 13 
debt discharge does not occur until a debtor’s payment plan is fulfilled, which occurs 
only a third of the time (Porter 2011, p. 107). Most Chapter 13 filers never complete their 
plans due to case dismissal, failure to continue plan payments, and failure to pay court 
costs (Skiba and Tobacman 2015; Porter 2011, p. 113). Not only is Chapter 13 worse 
than Chapter 7 from the perspective of successful debt discharge but also filing costs for 
Chapter 13 are higher by about 250 percent (Porter 2011, p. 108). Thus, nonrecourse 
loans may raise consumer welfare by reducing Chapter 13 bankruptcies.  
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Table 6 shows the effect of access to funding, as well as access to other types of 
credit, on the Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates. In contrast to access to credit card loans, 
access to funding, payday loans, and car-title loans decrease Chapter 7 filings. In contrast 
to access to payday lending, access to funding and car-title loans reduce Chapter 13 
filings. Obtaining more credit card or payday loans increases finance charges. These 
charges can escalate and exert pressure on consumers to file for bankruptcy. Title lenders 
take a security interest in the consumer’s car; the existence of collateral may distinguish 
car-title loans from credit card and payday loans. Funding differs from credit card and 
payday loans by a larger degree than car-title loans. A plaintiff cannot renew his 
nonrecourse loan or get another advance on the same case. Funding is capped at the 
lawsuit proceeds. Further, repayment of funding occurs at the end of the case and comes 
from an income-producing asset. Thus, funding customers need not continuously pay 
finance charges nor rely on their own (lack of) self-control to repay the loan (cf. Skiba 
and Tobacman 2008).  
In terms of the magnitude of effects, Table 6 shows that funding’s impact on the 
Chapter 7 filing rate is larger than the effects of credit card loans, payday loans, and car-
title loans. Funding’s influence on the Chapter 13 filing rate is less than the effect of 
payday loans but greater than the effect of car-title loans. The market for nonrecourse 
loans is likely smaller than the credit card, payday loan, and car-title loan markets 
because a nonrecourse loan must be attached to a legal claim. However, the magnitudes 
of the effects of funding are plausible because funding helps consumers in “distress” 
states. Funding caters to consumers who are most likely to file for bankruptcy (i.e., those 
who are injured, have low incomes, and have substantial debts). A large injury can result 
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in joblessness and hefty medical bills, or it can prompt the injured to seek extremely 
expensive forms of credit. Aiding consumers when they are in “distress” states may have 
a greater impact than lending money to credit-constrained consumers in general. 
Dobridge (2016) demonstrated that payday loan access helps households smooth their 
consumption of food (at home), home repairs, and mortgage payments in the month of an 
extreme weather event (i.e., in a “distress” state) but decreases household well-being (as 
measured by consumption) in an “average” state of the world. This is consistent with 
Morse (2011), which found that the presence of payday lenders mitigates the number of 
home foreclosures and larcenies in the year after a natural disaster in California. Thus, the 
magnitudes of the effects found in this paper are reasonable. 
8. Conclusion 
 Many opponents of consumer litigation funding argue for harsh restrictions, if not 
express bans, on this business practice in the name of consumer welfare. Their arguments 
hinge on comparisons of nonrecourse advances with payday loans, another high-cost 
financial product. This study is the first to empirically examine the effect of these 
advances on consumer welfare, as measured by Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies. I find that 
nonrecourse advances reduce both the Chapter 7 and 13 filing rates. This suggests that 
funding helps liquidity-constrained plaintiffs to avoid bankruptcy as they wait for the 
resolution of their cases. Unlike payday loans that increase Chapter 13 bankruptcies, 
funding reduces these bankruptcies. From the perspective of debt discharge success and 
bankruptcy filing fees, Chapter 7 is better than Chapter 13. Accordingly, funding may 
raise consumer welfare.    
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Tables 
Table 1. Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions 
State Action State (Time Period) Citation Expected Effect on 
Number of 
Nonrecourse Loans 
Prohibition 
Ohio (2003–2008) Rancman v. Interim 
Settlement Funding Corp., 
789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) 
Decrease (–) 
Interest Rate/Fee 
Cap 
Michigan (2004–present) Lawsuit Financial, LLC v. 
Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) 
Decrease (–) 
North Carolina (2008–present) 
 
Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 
665 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2008) 
Maryland (2009–present) Maryland Commissioner of 
Financial Regulation,  
DFR-EU 2008-241  
Kansas (2009–present) Kansas Office of the State 
Bank Commissioner, 
Consumer and Mortgage 
Lending Division,  
No. 2009-141 
Colorado (2013–present) Oasis Legal Finance Group, 
LLC v. Suthers, 369 P.3d 631 
(Colo. App. 2013), aff’d, 361 
P.3d 400 (Colo. 2015) 
South Carolina (2014–present) South Carolina Department 
of Consumer Affairs Formal 
Administrative Interpretation 
37.3.104, 106-1403 
Disclosure Law 
New York (2005–present) Attorney General of the State 
of New York, Bureau of 
Consumer Frauds and 
Protection, Assurance of 
Discontinuance Pursuant to 
Executive Law §63(15) 
Decrease (–) 
Maine (2008–present) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9–A, 
§ 12-104 
Ohio (2008–present) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 1349.55 
Nebraska (2010–present) Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.  
§ 25-3303 
Oklahoma (2013–present) Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A,  
§3-807 
Tennessee (2014–2015) Tenn. Code Ann.  
§ 47-51-106 
Acknowledgment 
Florida (1996–present) Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 
679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996) 
Increase (+) Texas (2006–present) Anglo-Dutch Petroleum 
International, Inc. v. Haskell, 
193 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. 
App. 2006) 
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Table 2. Expected Effects of State Actions on Number of Nonrecourse Loans and 
Bankruptcy Rates 
 Expected Effect 
on Number of 
Nonrecourse 
Loans 
Expected Effect on Bankruptcy Rates 
If consumption smoothing 
effect prevails 
If filing cost effect and/or 
cognitive biases-and-errors 
effect prevails 
Prohibition (β1) (–) (+) (–) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap (β2) (–) (+) (–) 
Disclosure Law (β3) (–) (+) (–) 
Acknowledgment (β4) (+) (–) (+) 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Dependent Variables Mean 
Chapter 7 Filings per 10,000 People 27.21 
Chapter 13 Filings per 10,000 People 11.42 
Chapter 7 & 13 Filings per 10,000 People 38.63 
Demographics and Economic Conditions Mean 
Percent of Population Female 50.23 
Percent of Population Hispanic 7.50 
Percent of Population Black 8.73 
Percent of Population Asian or Pacific Islander 1.03 
Percent of Population 65 Years or Older 15.70 
Percent of Population with At Least College Degree 23.66 
Income per Capita ($) 30,949.41 
Unemployment Rate (%) 6.26 
Home Price Index 185.40 
Note: N=54,827. Bankruptcy filings are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (1998-2012) 
and U.S. Courts Statistics and Reports (2013-15). Demographics are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Other 
controls include income per capita from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, unemployment rate from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and home price index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.  
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Table 4. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Chapter 7, 
Chapter 13, and Joint Chapter 7 and 13 Filing Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Basic 
Specification  
Weighted by 
Population 
Lagged 
Controls 
Great 
Recession 
Fixed Effects, 
Lagged 
Controls 
Ch. 7: Prohibition 4.189*** 4.832*** 3.907*** 4.189*** 5.343** 
 (0.720) (1.315) (0.784) (0.720) (2.045) 
Ch. 7: Interest/Fee Cap 2.735 2.217 2.224 2.735 2.888 
 (2.440) (2.057) (2.260) (2.440) (5.633) 
Ch. 7: Disclosure Law -0.780 -1.198 -0.746 -0.780 -0.367 
 (1.171) (2.597) (1.169) (1.171) (3.391) 
Ch. 7: Acknowledgment  4.855*** 3.240** 5.078** 4.855*** 2.287 
 (1.202) (1.303) (2.350) (1.202) (2.623) 
R-squared 0.619 0.699 0.612 0.619 0.512 
Ch. 13: Prohibition 3.202*** 3.580*** 2.713*** 3.202*** 1.661*** 
 (0.582) (0.686) (0.493) (0.582) (0.604) 
Ch. 13: Interest/Fee Cap 0.468 -2.109 0.697 0.468 0.595 
 (1.383) (1.269) (1.169) (1.383) (1.192) 
Ch. 13: Disclosure Law 0.0284 -0.327 -0.484 0.0284 -0.849 
 (0.682) (0.992) (0.687) (0.682) (0.955) 
Ch. 13: Acknowledgment  -4.010*** -4.246*** -3.119*** -4.010*** -2.632** 
 (0.480) (0.656) (0.885) (0.480) (1.047) 
R-squared 0.632 0.596 0.561 0.632 0.147 
Ch. 7 & 13: Prohibition 7.391*** 8.412*** 6.620*** 7.391*** 7.004*** 
 (1.047) (1.792) (0.991) (1.047) (2.526) 
Ch. 7 & 13: Interest/Fee  3.203 0.107 2.921 3.203 3.483 
 Cap            (2.627) (2.345) (2.589) (2.627) (6.133) 
Ch. 7 & 13: Disclosure  -0.752 -1.526 -1.230 -0.752 -1.216 
 Law            (1.524) (3.397) (1.486) (1.524) (4.143) 
Ch. 7 & 13:  0.845 -1.007 1.959 0.845 -0.345 
 Acknowledgment             (1.278) (1.713) (2.681) (1.278) (3.089) 
R-squared 0.634 0.680 0.604 0.634 0.502 
N (for all dependent vars.)       54,827       54,827       51,762       54,827 3,140 
counties 
Note: Bankruptcy filings are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (1998-2012) and U.S. 
Courts Statistics and Reports (2013-15). Columns (1) to (5) control for other laws, demographics, and 
economic conditions. Columns (1) to (4) include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered by state. Controls are from the U.S. Census Bureau (shares of the population that are female, 
Hispanic, black, Asian or Pacific Islander, 65 years or older, and with at least a college degree), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate), and Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (home price index). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
  
 97 
Table 5. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Nonbusiness 
and Business Bankruptcy Filing Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Nonbusiness 
Filings per 10,000 
Nonbusiness Ch. 11 
Filings per 10,000 
All Business 
Filings per 10,000 
Prohibition 7.389*** -0.00165 0.0664 
 (1.047) (0.00512) (0.112) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 3.209 0.00621 0.186 
 (2.629) (0.00440) (0.158) 
Disclosure Law -0.762 -0.0101 -0.133 
 (1.525) (0.00706) (0.183) 
Acknowledgment  0.848 0.00253 0.0302 
 (1.279) (0.00249) (0.119) 
N      54,827      54,827      54,827 
R-squared 0.634 0.016 0.122 
Note: Bankruptcy filings are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (1998-2012) and U.S. 
Courts Statistics and Reports (2013-15). All regressions include other laws, demographics, economic 
conditions, and state and year fixed effects. Controls are from the U.S. Census Bureau (shares of the 
population that are female, Hispanic, black, Asian or Pacific Islander, 65 years or older, and with at least a 
college degree), Bureau of Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(unemployment rate), and Federal Housing Finance Agency (home price index). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Table 6. Comparison of the Effects of Credit Access on Chapter 7 and 13 
Bankruptcy Filing Rates in Different Studies 
 Chapter 7 
Filing Rate 
Chapter 13  
Filing Rate 
Less Credit Access   
Morgan et al. (2012): payday loan ban  No effect –31% 
This paper: funding ban  20% 15% 
This paper: payday loan ban No effect –39% 
More Credit Access   
Dick and Lehnert (2010): growth in credit card loans 11% Did not examine 
Hynes (2012): payday loan legalization in military communities –7.1% No effect 
Fritzdixon (2015): car-title loan access  –4.5% –4.1% 
This paper: funding acknowledgment  No effect –23% 
Note: Percent effects reported are relative to the means reported in the respective studies. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on Chapter 7, 
Chapter 13, and Joint Chapter 7 and 13 Filing Rates – Fixed-Effects, Lagged-
Controls Specification Full Results 
 Ch. 7 Filings 
per 10,000 
Ch. 13 Filings 
per 10,000 
Ch. 7 & 13 Filings 
per 10,000 
Prohibition 5.343** 1.661*** 7.004*** 
 (2.045) (0.604) (2.526) 
Interest Rate/Fee Cap 2.888 0.595 3.483 
 (5.633) (1.192) (6.133) 
Disclosure Law -0.367 -0.849 -1.216 
 (3.391) (0.955) (4.143) 
Acknowledgment  2.287 -2.632** -0.345 
 (2.623) (1.047) (3.089) 
Champerty and Maintenance Law – – – 
    
Payday Loan Effective Ban 0.974 -4.453* -3.480 
 (2.092) (2.373) (2.497) 
Home Exemption Greater than $50K 5.017** 2.253 7.270** 
 (2.387) (1.384) (3.317) 
Federal Exemption Allowed -1.427 4.296** 2.869 
 (2.135) (1.815) (2.606) 
Garnishment Protection at Federal Level – – – 
    
BAPCPA -26.25*** -3.801*** -30.05*** 
 (2.218) (0.938) (2.396) 
Percent Female -576.9* -257.9 -834.7** 
 (298.3) (201.1) (404.0) 
Percent Hispanic 128.6 -57.95 70.63 
      (87.25) (47.86) (111.0) 
Percent Black -133.2 35.07 -98.11 
 (185.5) (104.2) (181.8) 
Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 45.84 -26.80 19.03 
 (59.53) (26.91) (56.85) 
Percent 65 Years or Older -349.7*** -93.84*** -443.5*** 
 (77.33) (25.55) (82.91) 
Percent with At Least a College Degree 58.35 -22.00 36.34 
 (49.20) (17.17) (49.25) 
Income per Capita -0.000170 0.000221* 5.04e-05 
 (0.000196) (0.000113) (0.000224) 
Unemployment Rate 2.096*** 0.381*** 2.476*** 
 (0.336) (0.0990) (0.354) 
Home Price Index 0.0819*** 0.0181* 0.100*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0108) (0.0344) 
Constant 348.3** 150.4 498.7** 
 (156.8) (103.1) (207.3) 
    
N 3,140 counties 3,140 counties 3,140 counties 
R-squared 0.512 0.147 0.502 
Note: Bankruptcy filings are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (1998-2012) and U.S. 
Courts Statistics and Reports (2013-15). Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Controls are from the 
U.S. Census Bureau (demographics), Bureau of Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (unemployment rate), and Federal Housing Finance Agency (home price index). *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 100 
Table A2. The Effects of State-Level Characteristics on Existence of State Actions 
 State Action Indicator State Action Tiers 
Percent Female 0.242 1.294 
 (9.535) (24.56) 
Percent Hispanic -1.098 0.434 
      (5.113) (17.60) 
Percent Black -7.392 -19.51 
 (9.242) (21.09) 
Percent Asian or Pacific Islander 0.444 1.214 
 (0.488) (1.443) 
Percent 65 Years or Older -2.049 -9.234 
 (4.672) (12.36) 
Percent with At Least a College Degree 1.689 2.669 
 (1.762) (5.325) 
Income per Capita 5.84e-06 1.32e-05 
 (9.44e-06) (2.74e-05) 
Unemployment Rate -0.00277 -0.0374 
 (0.0205) (0.0644) 
Home Price Index -0.00109 -0.00270 
 (0.00112) (0.00262) 
Financial Institutions Industry Contributions(t–2) -7.56e-09 -1.24e-08 
 (1.13e-08) (3.77e-08) 
Health Industry Contributions(t–2) 5.88e-09 1.35e-08 
 (4.74e-09) (1.33e-08) 
Insurance Industry Contributions(t–2) 0.000 -1.26e-08 
 (8.19e-09) (2.13e-08) 
Lawyers and Lobbyists Contributions(t–2) -4.26e-10 3.39e-09 
 (2.31e-09) (5.88e-09) 
State Governor Democrat 0.0140 0.0413 
 (0.0323) (0.0878) 
State Legislature Democrat -0.0257 -0.0480 
 (0.0419) (0.108) 
Constant -0.110 0.449 
 (4.769) (12.05) 
   
N 850 850 
R-squared 0.608 0.673 
Note: Data are from years 1999–2015. State-level characteristics are from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(demographics), Bureau of Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(unemployment rate), and Federal Housing Finance Agency (home price index). Political contributions data 
come from the National Institute on Money in State Politics, and political affiliation data come from Carl 
Klarner’s open access databases and the National Conference of State Legislatures partisan composition 
tables. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. All regressions include state and year 
fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A3. The Effects of Consumer Litigation Funding State Actions on FTC and 
CFPB Complaint Rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Basic 
Specification  
Weighted by 
Population 
Lagged 
Controls 
Fixed Effects, 
Lagged Controls 
FTC: Interest/Fee Cap -89.89* -184.3*** -100.1** -94.66** 
 (47.19) (59.71) (44.13) (38.06) 
FTC: Disclosure Law 23.82* -20.03 30.11 45.31* 
 (13.57) (37.94) (20.05) (25.98) 
FTC: Acknowledgment  -90.58 -370.7 335.9 – 
 (323.0) (646.3) (279.5)  
R-squared 0.633 0.726 0.638 0.465 
N 250 250 250 50 states 
CFPB: Interest/Fee Cap 1.828** 2.417*** 1.398* 1.168* 
 (0.804) (0.673) (0.773) (0.582) 
CFPB: Disclosure Law 1.887** 1.856** 1.840 0.978 
 (0.877) (0.781) (1.610) (1.119) 
CFPB: Acknowledgment  15.34 34.38 25.68** – 
 (13.35) (21.19) (10.64)  
R-squared 0.957 0.970 0.956 0.222 
N 200 200 200 50 states 
Note: Third-party debt collector complaint data are from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) for years 
2011-2015 and credit card and mortgage lender complaint data are from the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”) for years 2012-2015. Columns (1) to (4) control for other laws, demographics, and 
economic conditions. Columns (1) to (3) include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses 
are clustered by state. Controls are from the U.S. Census Bureau (shares of the population that are female, 
Hispanic, black, Asian or Pacific Islander, 65 years or older, and with at least a college degree), Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (income per capita), Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rate), and Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (home price index). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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CHAPTER III. CONSUMER LITIGATION FUNDING AND THE  
FINANCIER-LAW FIRM RELATIONSHIP 
 
1. Introduction 
In the past two decades, consumer litigation funding (“funding”)—the financing 
of tort plaintiffs by third party companies—has grown into a booming industry. In 
early 2010, the American Legal Finance Association (“ALFA”), a national trade 
association of consumer litigation financiers, had sixteen members (Garber 2010, p. 11). 
In late 2016, ALFA had thirty-six members (ALFA 2016). Garber (2010, p. 10 n. 14) and 
Nieuwveld and Shannon (2012, p. 123) have noted that at least eighty non-ALFA 
members operate in the funding market. The potential size of the market is quite large. In 
2015 alone, approximately 807,000 tort lawsuits were filed in state and federal courts.39 
This number is a lower bound because it does not take into consideration the thousands of 
automobile claims resolved via informal negotiations before official lawsuits are filed 
(Engstrom 2009, p. 1502–03). 
 This paper makes several contributions to the emerging literature on consumer 
litigation funding.40 It is the first to analyze financier administrative data.41 While other 
sources have offered information on amounts funded (i.e., cash advances given to the 
plaintiffs) and interest rates from legal industry anecdotes and interviews with financiers 
                                                
39 The National Center for State Courts Statistics Project reports the total number of tort filings for twenty-
six states and the District of Columbia. See http://www.courtstatistics.org. Using state population data from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, I projected a total number of tort filings for all states. I then added the 
number of tort claims filed in federal court, which is provided by U.S. Courts Statistics and Reports. See 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c02mar15_1.pdf.  
40 See Garber (2010), Beydler (2012), Estevao (2013), Daughety and Reinganum (2014), Avraham and 
Wickelgren (2014), Xiao (2015), Skiba and Xiao (forthcoming), Xiao (2017a), and Xiao (2017b). 
41 Abrams and Chen (2013) and Chen (2015) were the first to use financier administrative data to analyze 
commercial litigation funding. 
 103 
(Carter 2004; Garber 2010; Molot 2010; Griffis 2011; Appelbaum 2011), this work 
calculates descriptive statistics of transaction-level data from a regional financier. I find 
that the average amount funded is $1,826, the average interest rate is 8.09 percent per 
month (or about 97 percent per year), the average funding duration (i.e., the time from the 
contract date to the date of repayment) is 11.41 months, and the average total owed is 
$3,604. Further, this study is the first to provide any type of information about the gross 
return on funding. I find that the average total received by the financier at case resolution 
is $2,860, the average absolute return (i.e., total received minus amount funded) is 
$1,034, and the average return ratio (i.e., total received divided by amount funded) is 
1.58. The average total received is less than the average total owed by $744. 
This paper also examines whether the strength of the relationship between the 
financier and the plaintiff’s law firm is positively or negatively associated with the 
financier’s gross return and interest rate. I explore the financier-law firm relationship 
instead of the financier-attorney relationship for two main reasons. First, the ethics rules 
that govern the legal profession state that generally, one attorney’s conflict of interest 
should be imputed to the rest of the attorneys in the law firm. Therefore, the attorney and 
law firm are frequently treated as the same entity in situations where conflicts of interest 
involving clients arise. Second, personal injury law firms are increasingly using case 
managers, secretarial staff, and paralegals to do substantive work in cases 
(Engstrom 2009, p. 1495–96 n. 44, 1510–14; Parikh 2006, p. 264–65). Thus, the law 
firm—not just the individual attorney—may be more appropriately considered the legal 
services provider. 
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Critics of this industry have voiced concerns that financiers’ relationships with 
legal service providers (i.e., attorneys and law firms) adversely impact the relationships 
between these providers and their clients (see, e.g., McLaughlin 2007, p. 649–53). 
Attorneys have a duty to act in their clients’ best interests, but having strong relationships 
with financiers may prevent attorneys from doing so by creating situations in which 
attorneys and their law firms act to benefit financiers at the expense of their clients 
(ABA 2011, p. 16–17). Such actions that benefit financiers include recommending 
settlement when trial is the better option for a plaintiff or referring a plaintiff to a 
financier when not obtaining funding is better for the plaintiff. The former action may 
increase the financier’s gross return (or revenue), and the latter may give the financier a 
certain degree of market power to raise the interest rate (or price). Thus, critics would 
predict that a stronger financier-law firm relationship over time would benefit a 
financier’s gross return and hurt plaintiffs through a higher interest rate.  
In contrast, a strand of the “relationship lending” literature offers a different 
perspective (see Berger and Udell 1995; Boot and Thakor 1994; Petersen and 
Rajan 1994; Jimenez and Saurina 2004). The papers in this area suggest that relationships 
allow for a financier to gain knowledge of a law firm’s skill level and for trust to grow 
between the financier and law firm. As a result, the financier may become more willing 
to fund high-risk cases, thus reducing the financier’s gross return. The financier also may 
increasingly rely on law firm recommendations to fund cases, thus decreasing the 
financier’s case screening expenses and, in turn, the interest rate. 
This paper’s results do not provide empirical support for critics’ concerns. Rather, 
consistent with the aforementioned relationship lending literature, I find that a stronger 
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financier-law firm relationship is negatively associated with the financier’s absolute 
return, return ratio, and interest rate. Following studies in the relationship lending 
literature (e.g., Berger and Udell 1995; Degryse and Cayseele 2000), I measure the 
strength of the financier-law firm relationship using the duration of the relationship. One 
more year of relationship is associated with a decrease in the absolute return of $52.01 (or 
5.0 percent relative to the mean). Relative to a relationship duration of less than 4 years, a 
relationship duration of 4–7 years is associated with a $381.40 (or 37 percent relative to 
the mean) reduction in the absolute return, a 0.104 (or 6.6 percent relative to the mean) 
decrease in the return ratio, and a 1.28 percentage point (or 16 percent relative to the 
mean) reduction in the interest rate. Relative to a relationship duration of less than 
4 years, a relationship duration of 10 or more years is associated with a $561.00 (or 
54 percent relative to the mean) decrease in the absolute return and a 0.200 (or 10 percent 
relative to the mean) reduction in the return ratio. 
 Section 2 presents background information on consumer litigation funding. 
Section 3 describes critics’ concerns about the financier-law firm relationship and laws 
that govern this relationship. Section 4 provides the conceptual framework, which is 
informed by the relationship lending literature. Section 5 describes the data and empirical 
specifications. Section 6 reports the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 discusses 
the results, and Section 8 concludes.  
2. Background on Consumer Litigation Funding 
 Bar association articles reveal that a liquidity-constrained tort plaintiff with legal 
representation will often disclose his financial woes to his attorney and press his attorney 
to settle as soon as possible—often for an amount that the attorney considers “absurdly 
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low” (Michmerhuizen 2015; Todd 2010). In response, the attorney or another 
representative of the law firm may inform the plaintiff of the availability of consumer 
litigation funding (ABA 2011, p. 24). If the plaintiff has seen an advertisement of funding 
on the television or Internet,42 then he may directly ask his attorney about this credit 
product. Alternatively, a plaintiff may see an advertisement and contact a financier before 
obtaining legal representation. In that situation, the financier would instruct the plaintiff 
to get an attorney to assess his case.43  
Once the represented plaintiff learns about funding, he must decide whether or not 
to apply for an upfront cash advance in return for paying the advance plus fees out of the 
lawsuit proceeds. Customers primarily apply for funding via online forms and/or 
telephone interviews (Martin 2002, p. 85–86; Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). Local 
financiers may also keep an office open for consumers who would like to apply in 
person.44 Financiers support a wide spectrum of case types, including those that involve 
motor vehicle accidents, wrongful deaths, medical malpractice incidents, premises 
liability, and products liability.45 Automobile claims are financiers’ bread and butter 
                                                
42 See, e.g., Oasis Legal Finance Direct Response TV (DRTV) Commercial, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boFdLxChxrg (last visited Nov. 26, 2016). 
43 See, e.g., Plaintiff Referrals Program, NECESSITY FUNDING, 
http://www.necessityfunding.com/Plaintiff_Referrals_Program.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (offering 
referrals to attorneys in their network); Submit a Referral, PSFINANCE, http://www.psfinance.com/for-
attorneys/submit-a-referral.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (asking the attorney to fill out information if 
the attorney would like to be contacted for client referrals); For Attorneys, PLAINTIFF LEGAL FUNDING, 
http://www.plaintifflegalfunding.com/for-attorneys (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (asking the attorney to fill 
out information if the attorney would like to be contacted for client referrals). 
44 See, e.g., Contact Us, BROADWAY FUNDING GROUP, http://broadwayfundinggroup.com/contact-us (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2016) (a New York regional funder advertising their convenient location near the New 
York courthouses). 
45 See, e.g., Welcome to Necessity Funding, NECESSITY FUNDING, http://www.necessityfunding.com (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing the case types that the financier funds); Types of Cases We Fund, COVERED 
BRIDGE CAPITAL, http://www.covbridgecap.com/cases/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing the case types 
that the financier funds); How It Works, OASIS FINANCIAL, https://www.oasisfinancial.com/en/pre-
settlement-funding (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing the case types that the financier funds); What We 
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(Garber 2010, p. 10). All firms fund car accident claims, but some firms do not fund 
riskier types of cases such as medical malpractice lawsuits.46  
In his application, the plaintiff has to disclose basic claim information to the 
financier. The financier will obtain verification of the plaintiff’s facts and gain additional 
case information through communications with the plaintiff’s attorney.47 If the funder 
approves the application, then it will advance 10 to 20 percent of the expected case value 
to the customer (Appelbaum 2011; Garber 2010, p. 12). Commentators have reported 
cash advances (or amounts funded) ranging from $500 to $100,000 (Carter 2004; 
Garber 2010, p. 12). Plaintiffs typically use their advances to cover living costs such as 
utilities, car payments, rent, mortgage, food, and medical expenses (Rodak 2006, p. 514; 
Martin 2008, p. 84–85; Estevao 2013, p. 476; Garber 2010, p. 12; Skiba and Xiao, 
forthcoming). Because of this, most commentators surmise that the majority of plaintiffs 
who seek consumer litigation funding are liquidity-constrained or have low incomes 
(Rodak 2006, p. 514; Martin 2008, p. 84–85; Skiba and Xiao, forthcoming). Since most 
tort plaintiffs contract with attorneys to work on a contingency fee basis, plaintiffs 
usually do not use their advances to pay attorney’s fees.  
Consumers are obligated to repay the advance with fees out of the lawsuit 
proceeds. The fees are quite steep and can range from 2 to 15 percent per month, and 
annual percentage rates (“APRs”) are commonly over 100 percent (Carter 2004; 
                                                                                                                                            
Fund, US CLAIMS, http://www.usclaims.com/what-we-fund (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing the case 
types that the financier funds). 
46 See, e.g., Cash Advances for Victims of Auto Accidents, INSURADVANCE, http://www.insuradvance.com 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (funding only legal claims related to automobile accidents). 
47 See, e.g., Read About Our Process, PEACHTREE FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.peachtreefinancial.com/our-solutions/pre-settlement-funding.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2016) 
(describing the funding process). 
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Griffis 2011; Appelbaum 2011). When a case is resolved, the law firm will first disburse 
contingency fees to itself and then pay debts to the plaintiff’s higher-priority creditors 
(e.g., an ex-spouse who is owed child support) before paying the funder out of the 
remaining case proceeds.48 If the total owed to the funder exceeds these remaining 
proceeds, the law firm gives all of the remaining proceeds to the funder. The plaintiff 
owes the financier nothing beyond these remaining proceeds; thus, funding is referred to 
as a nonrecourse loan.49  
3. Conflicts of Interest and Related Laws 
 
Critics have expressed concerns that relationships between legal services 
providers (i.e., attorneys and law firms) and financiers may negatively impact plaintiffs 
(see, e.g., McLaughlin 2007, p. 649–53). Lawyers have a duty to render honest, 
independent legal advice to their clients and act in their clients’ best interests (see Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct 2.1, 1.1–1.3). By implicating lawyers’ (or law firms’) 
financial interests, legal finance may create situations in which lawyers (or law firms) are 
tempted to behave in a manner that is inconsistent with their clients’ best interests.  
One of the largest conflicts of interest arises due to the benefits of funding. Tort 
attorneys often face extremely cash-constrained plaintiffs; these plaintiffs likely suffered 
financial shocks after the incidents (e.g., car crashes, medical errors) that led to their legal 
                                                
48 See, e.g., Lawsuit Loans and Other Common Liens, SMP ADVANCE FUNDING, LLC, 
http://www.smpadvance.com/blog/2011/04/14/lawsuit-loans-and-other-common-liens/ (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2016) (describing potential liens against case proceeds); Liens—Lawsuit Funding Concerns, FAIR 
RATE FUNDING, http://www.fairratefunding.com/lawsuit-funding-blog/item/liens-lawsuit-funding-concerns 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2016) (describing potential liens against case proceeds); Liens Against a Lawsuit 
Settlement, BRIDGEWAY LEGAL FUNDING, http://www.bridgewaylf.com/blog/liens-against-lawsuit-
settlement (last visited Dec. 22, 2016) (describing potential liens against case proceeds).  
49 Depending on the state, a funding advance may or may not be considered a “loan” for legal purposes. For 
example, Michigan, North Carolina, Maryland, Kansas, Colorado, and South Carolina treat funding 
advances as loans. In contrast, Texas treats funding advances as investments.  
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claims (Chodes 2007; Todd 2010; Michmerhuizen 2015). These plaintiffs often request 
that their attorneys accept low offers that the attorneys believe to not be reflective of true 
case values. Nonrecourse loans may reduce these plaintiffs’ risk premiums and discount 
rates so that they hold out for higher settlements or survive until the end of trial 
(Xiao 2017a; Rodak 2006, p. 522–23). The availability of nonrecourse loans may also 
change plaintiffs’ filing calculus so that the expected benefits of litigation are greater than 
the expected costs (Xiao 2017a). Because funding can increase attorneys’ (or law firms’) 
returns on their portfolio of cases, attorneys (or law firms) may act in ways that benefit 
financiers, instead of current clients, so that the financiers will supply capital to future 
clients. Such actions may occur in the form of recommending the acceptance of a 
settlement offer to a funded client when trial is in the client’s best interests or referring an 
unfunded client to a financier when obtaining a nonrecourse loan is not in the client’s 
best interests.  
Potential conflicts of interest can also occur when a financier is an attorney’s (or 
law firm’s) past or current client, when an attorney (or law firm) owns a stake in a 
financier, when a financier is paying for litigation costs including attorney’s fees or 
financing a law firm in addition to funding that law firm’s tort plaintiff, and when a 
financier and attorney (or law firm) have formally or informally agreed to refer clients to 
each other (ABA 2011, p. 16–17; Shannon 2015, p. 905–06; Nieuwveld and 
Shannon 2012, p. 136). Conflicts involving financier payment of litigation costs will be 
rare because tort lawyers typically take clients on a contingency fee basis, which means 
that the lawyers front the litigation expenses. However, financiers could fund individual 
plaintiffs’ cases, as well as law firms’ case portfolios (Engstrom 2013); that is, a financier 
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could concurrently supply capital to a particular personal injury plaintiff and that 
plaintiff’s law firm.50  
In 2011, the American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 issued a 
report that stated attorneys should evaluate conflicts of interest concerning third-party 
financiers using the Rules of Professional Conduct, which are the ethics rules that govern 
the legal profession.51 In regard to conflicts involving a financier’s explicit influence on 
case decisions, Rule 1.2(a) states that plaintiffs have authority over settlement decisions. 
There are no express rules against plaintiffs delegating revocable settlement authority to 
financiers, but delegations of irrevocable authority are likely invalid (ABA 2011, p. 26–
27). With respect to conflicts involving an attorney’s own financial interests or a 
financier as a concurrent or former client, Rule 1.7(a)(2) states that if a “significant risk” 
exists that the representation of a plaintiff will be limited by “another client,” “a former 
client,” or “a personal interest of the lawyer” (including a financial one), then the attorney 
has a conflict of interest and cannot take that plaintiff’s case unless he can satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 1.7(b)(2) (including informed consent). In regard to the financier as 
a former client, Rule 1.9 presents additional criteria for the attorney to evaluate in 
deciding whether the attorney can represent the plaintiff. Rule 1.10 states that one 
attorney’s conflict generally should be imputed to the rest of the attorneys in the law firm.  
If an attorney (or law firm) owns a stake in a financier, then the financial conflict 
implicates Rule 1.8(a) regarding requirements that attorneys must meet in conducting 
business transactions with clients and Rule 1.8(e) regarding the prohibition of attorneys 
                                                
50 The regional financier from which I obtain data does not fund law firms in addition to individual 
plaintiffs. 
51 The specific language of the Rules of Professional Conduct varies by state. In this Section, “Rule” refers 
to the formulation of the rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
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giving financial assistance to clients. If a financier is paying for litigation costs, then the 
attorney must comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(f) regarding third-party 
compensation of attorneys. With regard to formal referral agreements, Rule 7.2(b) 
prohibits lawyers from giving “anything of value to a person” for referrals. Although 
informal referral agreements are not explicitly banned, they may violate Rule 1.7(a)(2), 
especially in markets with few financiers. For example, an attorney may be concerned 
that if he does not recommend certain settlements to funded clients or refer unfunded 
clients to the financier who is dominant in the market, then the financier will not refer 
any future consumers, with potential legal claims, to the attorney (see Xiao 2016, p. 65). 
 As of 2016, eight states—Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, and Vermont—have passed statutes to regulate consumer litigation funding. 
Almost all of these statutes include provisions that mitigate conflicts of interest. Table 1 
lists these provisions with their citations, organized by the conflict of interest that they 
address. With respect to conflicts involving a financier’s explicit influence on case 
decisions, all of the eight states except Arkansas have a provision that requires the 
financier to expressly disclaim case control in the plaintiff-financier contract. While such 
a provision can prevent the financier from expressly usurping the plaintiff’s role in 
making the settlement decision or dictating the attorney’s actions, it does not address the 
attorney’s own incentives (e.g., higher returns on his case portfolio from plaintiffs 
obtaining funding) to act in ways that benefit the financier. Rule 1.7, referenced in the 
preceding paragraph, is still the rule that most directly addresses conflicts involving the 
lawyer’s own financial interests.  
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In regard to the concern that an attorney’s, or law firm’s, financial stake in the 
funder will influence the attorney’s, or law firm’s, judgment, Vermont prohibits the 
attorney and law firm of the consumer from possessing financial interests in the financier. 
With respect to the concern that a financier will control an attorney by paying litigation 
costs, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Vermont prohibit the financier from paying for “court 
costs, filing fees, or attorney’s fees.” Indiana, Nebraska, and Ohio require the attorney to 
represent the consumer on a contingency fee basis; this ensures that the financier does not 
pay attorney’s fees.  
Finally, in regard to referrals between an attorney, or law firm, and a financier, 
Indiana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Vermont have anti-referral fee provisions 
that ban the financier from paying or accepting referral fees to or from the attorney or law 
firm. Indiana, Nebraska, and Tennessee also have provisions that prohibit the attorney 
from either paying or accepting referral fees to or from the financier. Further, Indiana, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Vermont have a categorical ban on financier referrals of 
consumers, even without fees, to a specific attorney or law firm; the statutes of the former 
three states include an additional phrase that permits financier referral to a “local or state 
bar referral service operated by a bar association or a nonprofit organization.”  
4. Conceptual Framework  
In this Section, I present a framework for thinking about how the strength of the 
financier-law firm relationship is associated with the gross return on funding and interest 
rate. My discussion is informed by the relationship lending literature. Relationship 
lending occurs when a lender gathers borrower-specific information over multiple 
transactions with the same borrower and benefits from this informational advantage (see 
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surveys Boot 2000 and Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004). While studies in this literature 
focus on banks continuously making standard loans (not nonrecourse loans) to small 
businesses for different investment projects, the findings of these studies can shed light 
on how the strength of the financier-law firm relationship is associated with the gross 
return on funding and interest rate. The financier is analogous to a bank, and the law firm 
is analogous to a small business. Each case, which comes with a different plaintiff, is 
comparable to a new investment project. As papers in this literature have used duration of 
the lender-borrower relationship as a measure of relationship strength (e.g., Berger and 
Udell 1995; Degryse and Cayseele 2000), I use the financier-law firm relationship 
duration as a measure of relationship strength. 
     4.1 The Financier-Law Firm Relationship and Gross Return on Funding  
 A stronger financier-law firm relationship (i.e., a relationship with a longer 
duration) may be associated with a higher or lower gross return on funding. If a law firm 
is acting in ways that benefit the financier in order to, for example, secure funding of 
future clients or obtain future financier referrals of consumers—consistent with critics’ 
concerns—then the gross return on funding should increase over the course of the 
relationship (“financier-benefit effect”). On the other hand, as a law firm’s 
trustworthiness grows over the span of the relationship, the financier may increase its 
willingness to provide funds, particularly for riskier cases (“riskier-cases effect”) (see 
Petersen and Rajan 1994, p. 5–6; Jimenez and Saurina 2004, p. 2195–96). Table 2 
summarizes the predicted direction of the association between the duration of the 
financier-law firm relationship and the gross return on funding. 
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     4.2 The Financier-Law Firm Relationship and Interest Rate 
A stronger financier-law firm relationship (i.e., a relationship with a longer 
duration) may be associated with a higher or lower interest rate. Berger and Udell (1995) 
found that the interest rate is decreasing in the lender-borrower relationship duration. 
Their findings are consistent with the theoretical results of Boot and Thakor (1994) and 
suggest that repeat interactions between the lender and borrower can reduce costly 
measures of screening (“cost-savings effect”). Lenders may offer higher rates at first, 
because borrower quality is initially unknown and adverse selection and moral hazard 
may exist. As borrower quality is revealed via repeat transactions, lenders reduce 
screening tactics that they had previously used to mitigate adverse selection and moral 
hazard (see Petersen and Rajan 1994, p. 3; Jimenez and Saurina 2004, p. 2195–96). Cost-
savings from screening may be passed on to borrowers in the form of lower prices. 
The cost-savings effect may result in a lower interest rate over the course of the 
financier-law firm relationship. The financier initially does not know law firm quality.52 
The skill levels of the law firm’s attorneys and staff members determine law firm quality. 
These skills are crucial to case selection, management, and outcomes (see 
Harris et al. 2005, p. 246; Shinall 2010, p. 270–78; Abrams and Yoon 2007; 
Trautner 2007; Kritzer 1997). Therefore, law firm quality greatly contributes to the 
success of a case. As law firm quality is initially unknown, adverse selection may exist 
when the financier funds plaintiffs represented by low quality law firms; low quality law 
                                                
52 The market for legal services is very opaque. A majority of Americans have expressed an inability to 
compare information about legal services, intimidation or confusion regarding the legal representation 
selection process, or a lack of resources to obtain the relevant information (Berenson 2001, p. 648). Further, 
legal services are credence goods, which means that buyers cannot verify the quality of the services even 
after consuming them. Mistreatment of consumers and fraud may exist in markets for credence goods 
(Darby and Karni 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006; Hilger 2016). 
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firms may be more likely to encourage plaintiffs to obtain nonrecourse loans. In order to 
mitigate adverse selection, the financier screens cases, though barriers such as the 
potential waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protection prevent 
the unfettered flow of information.53 After repeat interactions with a law firm, the 
financier learns law firm quality. Over time, screening costs are reduced, as the financier 
depends on the law firm’s recommendations to fund cases without seeking case-specific 
information. The financier’s cost-savings from less screening may pass to plaintiffs in the 
form of lower interest rates. 
In contrast, Degryse and Cayseele (2000) found that the interest rate is increasing 
in the lender-borrower relationship duration. Their results are consistent with the 
theoretical findings of Greenbaum et al. (1989), Sharpe (1990), and von Thadden (2004) 
and suggest that borrowers become locked into the lending relationship over time due to 
the lender’s private information and the borrower’s search costs (“lock-in effect”). 
Lenders may offer lower rates at first because they expect borrowers to become 
informationally captured over time (see Sharpe 1990, p. 1070; von Thadden 2004, p. 12; 
Greenbaum et al. 1989, p. 223). The private information that a lender gathers is hard to 
credibly transfer to another lender. Further, borrowers may have non-trivial costs in 
searching for another lender (see Greenbaum et al. 1989, p. 223). Thus, the informational 
advantage from the relationship and the borrower’s search costs give the lender a certain 
degree of market power or a limited ability to raise the price. The magnitude of the lock-
                                                
53 Voluntary revelation of the information in attorney-client communications and the attorney’s written 
materials can waive attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protection. Currently, very few 
state courts and legislatures have addressed whether disclosure to a third-party funder results in waiver, and 
the policy approaches are not all consistent (ABA 2011, p. 32–36; Giesel 2012, p. 1085; Giesel 2014, 
p. 101; Shannon 2015, p. 900–01; Nieuwveld and Shannon 2012, p. 142; Glover 2016, p. 923–26; 
Xiao 2016, p. 60–64). 
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in effect depends on the level of competition in the lender market (see Petersen and 
Rajan 1995, p. 408). 
The lock-in effect may result in an interest rate increase over the course of the 
financier-law firm relationship. A law firm is incentivized to build relationships with 
financiers because funding may increase the law firm’s returns on its case portfolio. For a 
law firm, building a relationship with a financier takes time and energy. The information 
conveyed to one financier about law firm skills and trustworthiness is likely not 
transferable to another financier. Additionally, the costs of searching for another financier 
that would consistently extend credit to the law firm’s plaintiffs are nontrivial. In order to 
minimize the costs of relationship building and searching for financiers, the law firm will 
likely choose to interact with at most a few financiers. Thus, each financier has a level of 
market power over the law firm and may choose to raise prices accordingly. The lock-in 
effect is consistent with critics’ view that a stronger financier-law firm relationship hurts 
plaintiffs.  
Table 2 summarizes the predicted direction of the association between the 
duration of the financier-law firm relationship and the interest rate. Whether the interest 
rate increases or decreases over the course of the financier-law firm relationship depends 
on whether the cost-savings effect or the lock-in effect dominates. Plaintiffs benefit if the 
cost-savings effect prevails.  
5. Data and Empirical Specifications 
     5.1 Description of the Data 
 This work is the first to analyze administrative data from a regional financier and 
to provide descriptive statistics of funding transactions. The data include the offered 
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interest rate, the date the funding occurred (i.e., the contract date), the date the payment 
was received, the amount funded, and the total received for the years 2002–2013.54 From 
the data, I construct the following variables: indicators for amounts funded of less than 
$1,000, $1,000–$1,500, $1,500–$2,000, and over $2,000; funding duration (i.e., the time 
from the contract date to the date of repayment); interest owed; total owed; absolute 
return (i.e., the total received above the amount funded); return ratio (i.e., total received 
divided by amount funded); an indicator that equals one if the amount funded was paid in 
full; an indicator that equals one if the total owed was paid in full; and an indicator that 
equals one if the financier received no repayment.  
Previously, no study has examined financier administrative data on amounts 
funded or interest rates. Commentators have reported average amounts funded and 
interest rates based on anecdotal evidence from the legal industry or interviews with 
financiers. Carter (2004) stated that amounts funded range from $500 to $100,000 and 
that interest rates range from 2 to 15 percent per month (and over 200 percent annually). 
Garber (2010, p. 12) explained that average amounts funded vary from $1,750 to $4,500. 
Molot (2010, p. 93) reported that interest rates vary from 3 to 5 percent per month or 
higher. Griffis (2011) stated that interest rates fluctuate from 36 to 150 percent per year. 
Appelbaum (2011) noted that interest rates often exceed 100 percent per year.  
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the data. The average amount funded is 
$1,826, which is consistent with Garber (2010). The average interest rate is 8.09 percent 
                                                
54 The total received was not recorded for some transactions. I drop these transactions from the sample. The 
data also include transactions for part of 2001. I include these transactions in creating the relationship 
duration variables but drop them from the sample for descriptive statistics and regressions. Inclusion of 
these transactions does not make a difference in the results. Finally, some transactions were under contracts 
with an interest rate schedule. For these, I used the average funding duration for that group of cases to 
generate and impute a monthly interest rate. The results of the interest rate regressions without these 
imputed values are very similar to the results in Table 6.  
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per month (or 97 percent per year since the rate is generally additive for this financier). 
Since interest rates have often been reported to exceed 100 percent annually, this 
financier’s average interest rate lies on the lower end of the spectrum. The average 
funding duration is 11.41 months. The average interest owed is $1,778, which is 
97 percent of the average amount funded. The average total owed is $3,604.  
This is the first study to provide any information on the gross return on funding. 
The average total received is $2,860, making the average absolute return $1,034 (about 
58 percent of the average amount funded). Thus, the average return ratio is 1.58. Taking 
into consideration the average funding duration, the financier earns about $90.62 per 
claim per month. The average total received ($2,860) is less than the average total owed 
($3,604) by about $744; that is, on average, about 79 percent of the total owed is paid. In 
approximately 92 percent of all the financier’s transactions, the amount funded is paid in 
full, and in about 53 percent of all transactions, the total owed is paid in full. The 
financier gets no repayment in about 7.8 percent of all transactions. Because I cannot 
observe litigation outcomes, no repayment can indicate either that the plaintiff lost or that 
the case proceeds remaining after paying attorney’s fees and other higher-priority liens 
were $0. 
In order to examine how relationship strength is associated with the gross return 
on funding and interest rate, I create relationship duration variables, which serve as 
measures for relationship strength. First, I form a continuous variable that captures the 
duration of the financier-law firm relationship (i.e., the date of the law firm’s most recent 
transaction minus the date of that law firm’s first funding). Second, I create indicators for 
relationship durations of less than 4 years, 4–7 years, 7–10 years, and 10 or more years; 
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each relationship duration indicator accounts for approximately a quartile of relationship 
lengths in the data.  
In order to capture differences in law firm skill levels, I construct indicators for 
the six law firms most frequently associated with funding transactions and a separate 
indicator for all other firms.55 Table 4 reports some law firm statistics. Column (1) shows 
the total number of transactions for the six most often affiliated law firms and the average 
number of transactions of the law firms in the other-firms category. Column (2) depicts 
the percent of total transactions that each law firm category takes. Interestingly, firm 1 
represents the plaintiffs for more than half of all the financier’s transactions; this suggests 
that the financier’s strongest law firm relationship is with firm 1. In the last column, the 
table shows the duration of the financier-law firm relationship at the time of the last 
transaction with the law firm in this time period. Firms 1–6 have all had relationships 
with the financier for over 12 years, but the firms in the others category have had an 
average relationship duration of only 3.88 years. 
Next, I provide some graphs to further shed light on the data. Figures 1–3 display 
the average absolute return, average return ratio, and average interest rate by year, over 
the 2002–2013 time period. Each figure includes a vertical bar at year 2008, which marks 
the approximate beginning of the Great Recession (NBER 2010). As a result of the 
economic crisis, hedge funds and other investors put their capital into legal finance 
because investments in litigation are assets not correlated with the stock market 
                                                
55 Because the data only include identifiers (not names) of the law firms, I cannot do research on the law 
firms and match the data to actual law firm characteristics, such as firm age or average consumer rating. 
Further, each law firm indicator should capture average case portfolio profitability associated with that law 
firm since I cannot observe lawsuit characteristics, such as case type. The financier stated that most of the 
cases were automobile tort cases. This is consistent with Garber (2010, p. 10), which reported that most of 
the lawsuits underlying funding transactions were connected with motor vehicle accidents. 
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(Steinitz 2011, p. 1283–84). Thus, in the post-2007 period, competition in the funding 
market rapidly increased. Figure 1 demonstrates that the average absolute return 
decreased from about $1,400 in 2004 to $875 in 2009. Figure 2 shows that the average 
return ratio steadily decreased from 2002 to 2005 and stayed between 1.54 and 1.61 from 
2005 to 2013. Figure 3 depicts the average interest rate, which fell from 11.4 percent in 
2002 to 7.5 percent in 2013. Generally, the average absolute return, average return ratio, 
and average interest rate were lower in the post-2007 period. 
Figures 4–6 present the average absolute return, average return ratio, and average 
interest rate over four categories of financier-law firm relationship duration. Figure 4 
shows that the average absolute return for a relationship duration of less than 4 years 
($1,234) is higher than the averages for relationship durations of 4–7 years ($988), 7–10 
years ($945), and 10 or more years ($982). Figure 5 demonstrates that the average return 
ratio for a relationship duration of less than 4 years (1.59) is slightly higher than the 
averages for relationship durations of 4–7 years (1.57) and 10 or more years (1.57); the 
average return ratio is the same for a relationship duration of 7–10 years. Figure 6 shows 
that the average interest rate for a relationship duration of less than 4 years (0.090) is 
higher than the averages for relationship durations of 4–7 years (0.084), 7–10 years 
(0.075), and 10 or more years (0.075). 
     5.2 Empirical Specifications 
 In this paper, I explore the associations between the financier-law firm 
relationship duration and two outcomes: the gross return on funding and interest rate. In 
order to examine the gross return, I run ordinary least squares regressions of the 
following form:  
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(1) Gross Return Variableait = α + ΣjβjTransaction Characteristicsi + ΣsθsEconomic 
Conditions(t–1) + ΣkπkRelationship Duration Measurea(i-1) + ΣcτcLaw Firm 
Indicatorsa + ΣtδtYeart + εait,  
in which the gross return variable for law firm a, transaction i, and year t is either the 
absolute return (i.e., total received minus amount funded) or return ratio (i.e., total 
received divided by amount funded). In order to examine the interest rate, I run ordinary 
least squares regressions of the following form:  
(2) Interest Rateait = α + ΣjβjTransaction Characteristicsi + ΣsθsEconomic 
Conditions(t–1) + ΣkπkRelationship Duration Measurea(i-1) + ΣcτcLaw Firm 
Indicatorsa + εait.  
In all of the regressions, transaction characteristics include funding duration, 
which is the term of the nonrecourse loan. In equation (1), transaction characteristics 
also include interest rate; regressions in which the dependent variable is the absolute 
return or interest rate also control for amount funded. In all of the regressions, economic 
conditions are for the year prior to the current transaction (t–1) and include the three-
month treasury-bill return rate (NYU 2016) to account for the underlying cost of capital 
in the economy and a post-2007 indicator to capture the increase in funding competition 
as a result of the Great Recession. In order to control for law firm-specific effects, I 
incorporate the law firm indicators (described in Section 5.1) into the regressions; I also 
cluster standard errors by law firm. Further, in equation (1), I account for year fixed 
effects.56 
                                                
56 In equation (2), I do not incorporate year fixed effects because they are extremely collinear with the 
return rate on a three-month treasury bill. In equations (1) and (2), I do not include state fixed effects 
because they are highly collinear with the law firm indicators.  
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The relationship duration measure is the variable of interest and can take the 
form of a continuous variable or indicators for relationship durations of 4–7 years, 7–
10 years, and 10 or more years (with a relationship duration of less than 4 years as the 
omitted category). This measure captures the strength of the relationship up to the point 
of a specific funding transaction (i) that is associated with a particular law firm (a). While 
accounting for all types of endogeneity is infeasible with the available data, I do address 
reverse causality by measuring the length of the relationship up to the previous funding 
transaction (i–1), not the current transaction (i), associated with that law firm (a); the 
gross return and interest rate for transaction i cannot determine the relationship length for 
transaction i–1. The gross return may increase or decrease in relationship duration, 
depending on whether the financier-benefit effect or riskier-cases effect dominates (see 
Table 2). The interest rate may also increase or decrease in relationship duration, 
depending on whether the cost-savings effect or lock-in effect prevails (see Table 2). 
Thus, Σkπk may be positive or negative in equations (1) and (2).  
6. Results 
 In Table 5, columns (1) and (2) report the results of regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the absolute return. A 0.01 increase in the interest rate is associated 
with an increase in the absolute return by $58.79 (or 5.7 percent relative to the mean). 
Relative to an amount funded of less than $1,000, higher amounts funded are associated 
with higher absolute returns. Next, an additional year of relationship is associated with a 
decrease in the absolute return of $52.01 (or 5.0 percent relative to the mean). The 
relationship duration indicators demonstrate that relative to a relationship duration of less 
than 4 years, a relationship duration of 4–7 years is associated with a $381.40 (or a 
 123 
37 percent relative to the mean) reduction in the absolute return, and a relationship 
duration of 10 or more years is associated with a $561.00 (or a 54 percent relative to the 
mean) reduction in the absolute return. 
In Table 5, columns (3) and (4) report the results of regressions in which the 
dependent variable is the return ratio. A 0.01 increase in the interest rate is associated 
with a 0.026 (or a 1.6 percent relative to the mean) increase in the return ratio. Relative to 
a relationship duration of less than 4 years, a relationship duration of 4–7 years is 
associated with a 0.104 (or a 6.6 percent relative to the mean) decrease in the return ratio, 
and a relationship duration of 10 or more years is associated with a 0.200 (or a 13 percent 
relative to the mean) decrease in the return ratio. Further, in column (4), the post-2007 
indicator is associated with a 0.162 (or a 10 percent relative to the mean) reduction in the 
return ratio. 
Table 6 reports the results of regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
interest rate. An additional month in funding duration is associated with a 0.04 
percentage point (or 0.5 percent relative to the mean) increase in the interest rate. 
Relative to an amount funded of less than $1,000, an amount funded of over $2,000 is 
associated with a 0.92 percentage point (or a 11 percent relative to the mean) decrease in 
the interest rate. The post-2007 indicator is associated with a 1.44–1.68 percentage point 
(or a 18–21 percent relative to the mean) reduction in the interest rate. Relative to a 
relationship duration of less than 4 years, a relationship duration of 4–7 years is 
associated with a 1.28 percentage point (or a 16 percent relative to the mean) decrease in 
the interest rate. Finally, in column (4), a 0.01 increase in the three-month treasury-bill 
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return rate is associated with a 0.20 percentage point (or a 2.5 percent relative to the 
mean) increase in the interest rate. 
7. Discussion 
 Overall, this paper provides some evidence that a longer financier-law firm 
relationship duration is associated with a lower absolute return, a lower return ratio, and a 
lower interest rate. One more year of relationship is associated with a decrease in the 
absolute return of $52.01. Relative to a relationship duration of less than 4 years, a 
relationship duration of 4–7 years is associated with a $381.40 reduction in the absolute 
return, a 0.104 decrease in the return ratio, and a 1.28 percentage point reduction in the 
interest rate. Relative to a relationship duration of less than 4 years, a relationship 
duration of 10 or more years is associated with a $561.00 decrease in the absolute return 
and a 0.200 reduction in the return ratio. 
 This study suggests that the financier-law firm relationship does not unilaterally 
benefit financiers at the expense of plaintiffs. The results show that over the course of the 
financier-law firm relationship, measures of gross return (i.e., the absolute return and 
return ratio) decrease. This finding is consistent with the theory that as the financier-law 
firm relationship grows stronger, the financier funds riskier cases. This may benefit 
certain plaintiffs with high-risk lawsuits. Additionally, the lower interest rate in 
relationship years 4–7 suggests that the financier reduces screening during this time as it 
relies on law firm funding recommendations. Such a decrease in the interest rate benefits 
all plaintiffs receiving litigation funding. Further, if a stronger financier-law firm 
relationship results in lower screening expenses, then the financier’s net return (or profit) 
may have increased (or remained steady) even though the gross return fell. In fact, this 
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may be one of the reasons the financier is willing to fund riskier cases. Unfortunately, 
because the data do not include information on the financier’s costs of operation, I cannot 
directly examine the net return. 
Neither the statutory regulation of the financier-law firm relationship described in 
Section 3 nor express contracts between the financier and law firms can explain the 
significance of the relationship duration variables. During this time period, the only rules 
that governed the financier-law firm relationship were the Rules of Professional 
Responsibility. Moreover, the financier stated that it did not have any express contracts 
with the law firms.  
This paper also provides some evidence that greater competition in the legal 
finance market, as a result of the Great Recession, might have decreased the gross return 
on funding and interest rate. The post-2007 indicator is associated with a 0.162 reduction 
in the return ratio and a 1.44–1.68 percentage point reduction in the interest rate. Since I 
have data for only one financier and do not have measures of competition for the regional 
funding market, I cannot directly control for competition.57 To the extent that the post-
2007 indicator does not account for the (potential) increase in competition, there would 
be an upward bias in the findings; that is, without direct controls for competition, the 
current relationship duration results would be underestimates of the true effects. Although 
Boot and Thakor’s (2000) model predicted that inter-lender competition could increase 
relationship lending, empirical papers since then have demonstrated that competition 
actually decreases relationship lending (see Memmel et al. 2007; Degryse and 
Ongena 2007; Elsas 2005; Presbitero and Zazzaro 2011). Thus, controlling for 
                                                
57 Most states do not require consumer litigation funders to be registered in the states that they provide 
funding. Further, most funders do not list the states in which they operate on their websites. 
 126 
competition would account for the decrease in relationship lending and would increase 
the effect of relationship duration.   
 Finally, with the available data, I am unable to address joint determination or 
selection. In regard to joint determination, the financier concurrently makes decisions 
with regard to all the contract terms, such as interest rate and amount funded. With 
respect to selection, information revelation over the course of the financier-law firm 
relationship may result in the financier’s refusal to advance cash to plaintiffs affiliated 
with low skill, untrustworthy law firms.58 Also, the law firms that the financier continues 
to work with may advocate for better financier-plaintiff contract terms, such as a lower 
interest rate. As a result of joint determination and selection, the relationship duration 
variables should not be interpreted to have a causal effect. However, the results are still 
informative. Further, these issues do not appear to be major concerns in the literature. For 
example, in regard to selection, Berger and Udell (1995) note that all of the lender’s 
actions, such as terminating a lending relationship, are considered a valid part of 
relationship lending. 
8. Conclusion 
 In sum, this paper is the first to analyze financier administrative data and provides 
evidence that a stronger (i.e., longer) financier-law firm relationship is associated with a 
lower gross return on funding and a lower interest rate. Critics of legal finance have 
voiced concerns that a stronger financier-law firm relationship may result in the attorney, 
or law firm, acting in ways that benefit the financier at the expense of the law firm’s 
current clients. The findings of this study do not provide empirical support for these 
                                                
58 The magnitude of any potential selection effect may not be very large because approximately 78 percent 
of the transactions in the data are associated with law firms that have had relationships with the financier 
for over twelve years (see Table 4).  
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concerns. Instead, they show that a stronger financier-law firm relationship may produce 
benefits for plaintiffs. Some plaintiffs affiliated with trustworthy and high skill law firms 
may benefit from the financier funding their high-risk cases. Other plaintiffs may benefit 
from price decreases. 
  
 128 
References 
 
Abrams, David S., and Daniel L. Chen. 2013. “A Market for Justice: A First Empirical 
Look at Third Party Litigation Funding.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business 
Law 15 (4): 1075–109. 
 
Abrams, David S., and Albert H. Yoon. 2007. “The Luck of the Draw: Using Random 
Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability.” University Chicago Law Review 
74 (4): 1145–77. 
 
American Bar Association Committee on Ethics 20/20 (ABA). 2011. “White Paper on 
Alternative Litigation Finance.” 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft
_alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf (last accessed December 2016).  
 
American Legal Finance Association (ALFA). 2016. “ALFA Member Companies.” 
https://americanlegalfin.com/alfa-membership/alfa-member-companies/ (last accessed 
October 2016). 
 
Appelbaum, Binyamin. 2011. “Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured.” N.Y. 
Times, January 16. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/business/17lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(last accessed September 2016).   
 
Avraham, Ronen, and Abraham Wickelgren. 2014. “Third-Party Litigation Funding – A 
Signaling Model.” DePaul Law Review 63 (2): 233–64. 
 
Berenson, Steven K. 2001. “Is It Time for Lawyer Profiles?” Fordham Law Review 
70 (3): 645–90. 
 
Berger, Allen N., and Gregory F. Udell. 1995. “Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit 
in Small Firm Finance.” Journal of Business 68 (3): 351–81.  
 
Beydler, Nicholas. 2012. “Risky Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating 
Consumer Litigation Funding.” University of Missouri Kansas City Law Review 80 (4): 
1159–86. 
 
Boot, Arnoud W. A. 2000. “Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 9 (1): 7–25. 
 
Boot, Arnoud W. A., and Anjan V. Thakor. 1994. “Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in 
an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game.” International Economic Review 35 (4): 
899–920. 
 
Boot, Arnoud W. A., and Anjan V. Thakor. 2000. “Can Relationship Banking Survive 
Competition?” Journal of Finance 55 (2): 679–713. 
 129 
Carter, Terry. 2004. “Cash Up Front: New Funding Sources Ease Financial Strains on 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers.” American Bar Association Journal, October 8. 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/cash_up_front (last accessed 
September 2016).   
 
Chen, Daniel L. 2015. “Can Markets Stimulate Rights? On the Alienability of Legal 
Claims.” RAND Journal of Economics 46 (1): 23–65. 
 
Chodes, Gary. 2007. “The Advantages of Legal Funding.” FindLaw.com, October.  
http://practice.findlaw.com/financing-a-law-firm/the-advantages-of-legal-funding.html 
(last accessed December 2016). 
 
Darby, Michael R., and Edi Karni. 1973. “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of 
Fraud.” Journal of Law and Economics 16 (1): 67–88. 
 
Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum. 2014. “The Effect of Third-Party 
Funding of Plaintiffs on Settlement.” American Economic Review 104 (8): 2552–66. 
 
Degryse, Hans, and Patrick Van Cayseele. 2000. “Relationship Lending within a Bank-
Based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data.” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 9 (1): 90–109. 
 
Degryse, Hans, and Steven Ongena. 2007. “The Impact of Competition on Bank 
Orientation.” Journal of Financial Intermediation 16 (3): 399–424.  
 
Dulleck, Uwe, and Rudolf Kerschbamer. 2006. “On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer 
Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods.” Journal of Economic Literature 44 (1): 
5–42.  
 
Elsas, Ralf. 2005. “Empirical Determinants of Relationship Lending.” Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 14 (1): 32–57. 
 
Elyasiani, Elyas, and Lawrence G. Goldberg. 2004. “Relationship Lending: A Survey of 
the Literature.” Journal of Economics and Business 56 (4): 315–30. 
 
Engstrom, Nora Freeman. 2009. “Run-of-the-Mill Justice.” Georgetown Journal of Legal 
Ethics 22 (4): 1485–547. 
 
Engstrom, Nora Freeman. 2013. “Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer 
Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again.” UCLA Law Review 
Discourse 61: 110–25. 
 
Estevao, Martin J. 2013. “The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect and 
Inform Consumers.” University of Colorado Law Review 84 (2): 467–96. 
 
 130 
Garber, Steven. 2010. “Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States.” RAND 
Institute for Civil Justice (Law, Finance, and Capital Markets Program) Occasional 
Paper. 
 
Giesel, Grace M. 2012. “Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine.” 
Wake Forest Law Review 47 (5): 1083–140. 
 
Giesel, Grace M. 2014. “Alternative Litigation Finance and the Attorney-Client 
Privilege.” Denver University Law Review 92 (1): 95–143. 
 
Glover, J. Maria. 2016. “Alternative Litigation Finance and the Limits of the Work-
Product Doctrine.” New York University Journal of Law and Business 12 (3): 911–42. 
 
Greenbaum, Stuart I., George Kanatas, and Itzhak Venezia. 1988. “Equilibrium Loan 
Pricing Under the Bank-Client Relationship.” Journal of Banking and Finance 13 (2): 
221–35. 
 
Griffis, Kirby. 2011. “Follow the Money: Litigation Funders Back Your Foes.” 
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, July 1. 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/14606/follow-money-litigation-funders-back-
your-foes (last accessed September 2016). 
 
Harris, Catherine T., Ralph Peeples, and Thomas B. Metzloff. 2005. “Who Are Those 
Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs’ Attorneys.” 
Southern Methodist University Law Review 58 (2): 225–58. 
 
Hilger, Nathaniel G. “Why Don’t People Trust Experts?” Journal of Law and Economics 
59 (2): 293–311. 
 
Jimenez, Gabriel, and Jesus Saurina. 2004. “Collateral, Type of Lender and Relationship 
Banking as Determinants of Credit Risk.” Journal of Banking and Finance 28 (2): 2191–
212. 
 
Kritzer, Herbert M. 2007. “Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice 
System.” Judicature 81 (1): 22–29. 
 
Martin, Susan Lorde. 2002. “Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles.” 
DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal 1 (1): 85–102. 
 
Martin, Susan Lorde. 2008. “Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a 
Place in the United States Market.” Villanova Law Review 53 (1): 83–116. 
 
McLaughlin, Julia H. 2007. “Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course.” 
Vermont Law Review 31 (3): 615–62. 
 
 131 
Memmel, Christoph, Christian Schmieder, and Ingrid Stein. 2007. “Relationship 
Lending: Empirical Evidence for Germany.” Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and 
Financial Studies 14, Deutsche Bundesbank.  
 
Michmerhuizen, Susan. 2015. “Ethics Tip: Financial Assistance to Clients.” ABA Center 
for Professional Responsibility, September. 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/ethicssearch/ethi
cstipseptember2015.html (last accessed December 2016). 
 
Molot, Jonathan T. 2010. “Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural 
Problem.” Georgetown Law Journal 99 (1): 65–115. 
 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 2010. “Business Cycle Dating 
Committee.” NBER, September 20. http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html (last 
accessed December 2016).   
 
New York University (NYU). 2016. “Annual Returns on Stock, T.Bonds and T.Bills: 
1928 – Current.” 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html (last 
accessed October 2016). 
 
Nieuwveld, Lisa Bench, and Victoria Shannon. 2012. Third-Party Funding in 
International Arbitration. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Parikh, Sara. 2006. “How the Spider Catches the Fly: Referral Networks in the Plaintiffs’ 
Personal Injury Bar.” New York Law School Law Review 51 (2): 243–83. 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 1994. “The Benefits of Lending 
Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data.” Journal of Finance 49 (1): 3–37. 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A., and Raghuram G. Rajan. 1995. “The Effect of Credit Market 
Competition on Lending Relationships.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (2): 407–
43. 
 
Presbitero, Andrea, and Alberto Zazzaro. 2011. “Competition and Relationship Lending: 
Friends or Foes?” Journal of Financial Intermediation 20 (3): 387–413.  
 
Rodak, Mariel. 2006. “It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Litigation 
Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
155 (2): 503–35. 
 
Shannon, Victoria A. 2015. “Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation.” 
Cardozo Law Review 36 (3): 861–912. 
 
 132 
Sharpe, Steven A. 1990. “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit 
Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships.” Journal of Finance 45 (4): 
1069–87.  
 
Shinall, Jennifer Bennett. 2010. “Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney 
Skill on Trial Outcomes.” Vanderbilt Law Review 63 (1): 267–306. 
 
Skiba, Paige Marta, and Jean Xiao. 2017. “Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another 
Form of Payday Lending?” Law and Contemporary Problems, forthcoming.  
 
Steinitz, Maya. 2011. “Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding.” 
Minnesota Law Review 95 (4): 1268–338. 
 
Todd, Hope C. 2010. “Helping the Indigent Client: A Threat to lawyer Independence?” 
Washington Lawyer, November. https://www.dcbar.org/bar-
resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/november-2010-speaking-of-
ethics.cfm (last accessed December 2016). 
 
Trautner, Mary Nell. 2007. “How Social Hierarchies Within the Personal Injury Bar 
Affect Case Screening Decisions.” New York Law School Law Review 51 (2): 215–40. 
 
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig. 2004. “Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and 
Implicit Contracts: The Winner’s Curse.” Finance Research Letters 1 (1): 11–23. 
 
Xiao, Jean. 2015. “Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the 
Bargaining Table.” Vanderbilt Law Review 68 (1): 261–96. 
 
Xiao, Jean. 2016. “In Defense of Patent Trolls: Patent Assertion Entities as Commercial 
Litigation Funders.” Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property Law 16 (1): 36–66. 
 
Xiao, Jean. 2017a. “The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Medical Malpractice 
Litigation.” Working Paper. 
 
Xiao, Jean. 2017b. “The Effect of Consumer Litigation Funding on Bankruptcy.” 
Working Paper. 
 
 
  
 133 
Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Consumer Litigation Funding Statute Provisions that Mitigate Conflicts of 
Interest 
Conflicts of Interest Funding Statute Provisions Citations 
Financier explicitly 
influences case 
decisions 
Mandatory inclusion of text 
disclaiming case control in the 
funding contract 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-4-1(3)  
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9–A, § 12-104(7) 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3303(1)(c) 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55(B)(3) 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §3-814(7)  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-106(b)(2) 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2253(b)(10)  
Attorney or law firm 
owns stake in financier 
Attorney and law firm shall not 
have financial interest in financier 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2254(b) 
Financier pays for 
litigation costs 
(including attorney’s 
fees)  
Financier shall not pay for litigation 
costs 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-3-1(7)  
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §3-814(8)  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(5)  
Attorney must be paid on a 
contingency fee basis 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-2-1(4)(B)  
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3303(1)(f)(ii)  
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.55(B)(6)(b)  
Informal/formal referral 
agreement 
Financier shall not pay referral fees 
to attorney or law firm 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-3-1(1)  
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3304(1)  
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §3-814(1)  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-105(1)  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(1)  
Financier shall not accept referral 
fees from attorney or law firm 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-3-1(2)  
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3304(2) 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §3-814(2)  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-105(2)  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(2)  
Attorney shall not pay referral fees 
to financier 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-104(4)(E) 
Attorney shall not accept referral 
fees from financier 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-2-1(4)(E)  
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3303(1)(f)(v)  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-104(4)(E)  
Financier shall not refer consumer 
to specific attorney or law firm 
Ind. Code Ann. § 24-12-3-1(4)  
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §3-814(4)  
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-51-105(4)  
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 2254(a)(6)  
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Table 2. Predictions on How the Duration of the Financier-Law Firm Relationship 
Is Associated with Gross Return and Interest Rate 
 Association with 
Gross Return 
Law firms act in ways that benefit the financier in order to further the law firms’  
     own interests (“financier-benefit effect”) (+) 
As the financier learns more about the law firms and trusts the law firms more, the  
     financier becomes more willing to fund riskier cases (“riskier-cases effect”) (–) 
 Association with 
Interest Rate 
The financier charges a higher interest rate due to market power, resulting from an  
     informational advantage and law firms’ search costs (“lock-in effect”) (+) 
The financier passes on cost-savings to consumers from reductions in case  
     screening measures (“cost-savings effect”) (–) 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 Mean 
Amount funded ($) 1,826  
Total received ($) 2,860 
Interest rate (% per month) 8.09 
Funding duration (months) 11.41 
Interest owed ($) 1,778 
Total owed ($) 3,604 
Absolute return (total received minus amount funded) ($) 1,034 
Return ratio (total received/amount funded) 1.58 
Percent paid of total owed (total received/total owed) 79.37 
Percent of transactions in which amount funded is paid in full 91.71 
Percent of transactions in which total owed is paid in full  52.87 
Percent of transactions in which financier gets no repayment 7.79 
N=4,403. Author’s calculations are from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013.  
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Table 4. Law Firm Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total number of 
transactions 
Percent of total 
transactions 
Duration of relationship with financier 
at the last transaction (years) 
Firm 1  2,214 50.28 12.73 
Firm 2 401 9.11 12.21 
Firm 3 261 5.93 12.50 
Firm 4 219 4.97 12.55 
Firm 5 188 4.27 12.33 
Firm 6 169 3.84 12.58 
All other firms 26 (average) 21.60 (sum) 3.88 (average) 
N=4,403. Author’s calculations are from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 1. Average Absolute Return by Year 
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 2. Average Return Ratio by Year 
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 3. Average Interest Rate by Year 
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 4. Financier-Law Firm Relationship Duration and Average Absolute Return 
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 5. Financier-Law Firm Relationship Duration and Average Return Ratio 
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Figure 6. Financier-Law Firm Relationship Duration and Average Interest Rate  
 
N=4,403. Author created the figure from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for 
years 2002–2013. 
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Table 5. Gross Return Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Absolute 
return 
Absolute 
return 
Return 
ratio 
Return 
ratio 
Interest rate 5,879** 5,782** 2.625** 2.619** 
 (1,614) (1,619) (0.872) (0.852) 
Funding durationi (months) -10.47 -12.08 -0.00272 -0.00358 
 (9.788) (11.15) (0.00306) (0.00330) 
Amount fundedi $1,000-$1,500 254.2*** 254.3*** – – 
 (31.93) (31.82)   
Amount fundedi $1,500-$2,000 643.8*** 642.1*** – – 
 (61.24) (63.71)   
Amount fundedi $2,000+ 1,491*** 1,493*** – – 
 (62.15) (60.03)   
Three-month treasury-bill return rate(t-1) 35.84 2,672 2.532 3.374 
 (5,875) (5,545) (2.435) (2.301) 
Post-2007 indicator -271.7 -415.6 -0.108 -0.162* 
 (215.0) (310.3) (0.0580) (0.0668) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) (years) -52.01** – -0.0162 – 
 (19.74)  (0.0125)  
Relationship durationa(i-1) 4-7 yrs – -381.4** – -0.104* 
  (127.8)  (0.0492) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) 7-10 yrs – -240.4 – -0.0516 
  (200.9)  (0.0859) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) 10+ yrs – -561.0*** – -0.200** 
       (131.3)  (0.0796) 
     
N 4,403 4,403 4,403 4,403 
R Squared 0.131 0.132 0.042 0.045 
Author’s calculations are from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for years 2002–
2013. All regressions include law firm indicators and payment year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered 
by law firm are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
  
 144 
Table 6. Interest Rate Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
Funding durationi (months) 0.000359*** 0.000361*** 
 (0.000041) (0.000042) 
Amount fundedi $1,000-$1,500 -0.000545 -0.000708 
 (0.003581) (0.003195) 
Amount fundedi $1,500-$2,000 -0.001722 -0.001632 
 (0.004210) (0.003623) 
Amount fundedi $2,000+ -0.009159* -0.009179** 
 (0.003810) (0.003226) 
Three-month treasury-bill return rate(t-1) 0.063275 0.200500*** 
 (0.065707) (0.048689) 
Post-2007 indicator -0.014373* -0.016811** 
 (0.006446) (0.006135) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) (years) -0.000442 – 
 (0.000693)  
Relationship durationa(i-1) 4-7 yrs – -0.012823*** 
  (0.002555) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) 7-10 yrs – -0.005060 
  (0.005584) 
Relationship durationa(i-1) 10+ yrs – -0.002847 
       (0.006141) 
   
N     4,403     4,403 
R Squared 0.258 0.273 
Author’s calculations are from administrative data of a regional consumer litigation funder for years 2002–
2013. All regressions include law firm indicators. Standard errors clustered by law firm are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
